Hire an NYU PhD Student

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Arias.jpgEric Arias

Eric Arias is Ph.D. Candidate in Politics at NYU. His research spans international and comparative political economy, focusing on the international sources of domestic politics and political economy of development (with a regional specialization in Latin America). He combines experimental and observational methods at different levels of analysis to explore two lines of inquiry: (1) how international flows of capital affect development and political accountability, and (2) the role of information and individual-level preferences in shaping these processes. His main line of inquiry explores the influence of international financial markets on development and political accountability, focusing on patronage politics and leader survival in the developing world. Here, Eric shows how the US Federal Reserve policy influences governance, finding that a looser policy increases patronage, corruption and decreases transparency. He also examines how international investment agreements improve creditworthiness and leader survival as well as leadership survival under fiscal austerity. His second stream of research studies how information and preferences affect political accountability and development outcomes, including social norms, corruption, and monetary and fiscal policy. He shows how prior beliefs determine voters' reaction to political information, finding that even severe corruption revelations increase incumbent support when voters already believe their incumbent is malfeasant. He also shows how public information influences social norms through common knowledge. His research has been supported by EGAP's Metaketa Initiative, Oxford Policy Management's EDI program and UNESCO. He has experience working for the World Bank and the German-Argentine Chamber of Commerce.

Bausch.jpegAndrew W Bausch

Andrew W. Bausch is an Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Institute for Politics and Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University. He received his PhD from New York University in May 2014. His dissertation, entitled “Three Essays on Regime Type and Warfare,” examines the micro-foundations of Democratic Peace Theory, relying on Selectorate Theory, laboratory experiments, and an agent-based model to understand causal mechanisms behind why democracies tend not to fight each other. He has continued to work on laboratory experiments that explore the incentives leaders face when engaging in inter-group conflict. His most recent paper, “Outcomes and Audience Costs in an Incentivized Laboratory Experiment,” shows that citizens evaluate leaders on the basis of the outcomes they produce in a conflict rather than the decision-making process they took to reach that outcome.

In addition, Andrew has co-authored papers using laboratory experiments to study terrorism and used computational models to explore the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma. Furthermore, he is working with co-authors on projects that examine how citizens that experienced indiscriminate violence in Eastern Ukraine evaluate the government. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, NYU's Center for Experimental Social Science, and Carnegie Mellon University's Center for International Relations and Politics. His work appears or is forthcoming in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Political Behavior, International Interactions, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Political Science Research and Methods, and Complexity. At Carnegie Mellon, Andrew has taught several classes, including “Democracies and War,” “Autocrats and Democrats,” “Comparative Political Systems,” and "Political Science Research Methods.”  

Bernabel.jpegRodolpho Talaisys Bernabel

Rodolpho Bernabel is a Ph.D. candidate (expected Spring 2016) in the Department of Politics at NYU. His areas of research are Comparative and American Politics, Biology of Politics, Quantitative Methods, and Experiments. The bulk of his research investigates, through formal modeling and laboratory experiments, how political institutions affect political behavior in terms of accountability. In this line of researching he has studied the effect of federalism in the replacement of corrupt leaders. He finds that corrupt presidents are replaced more often in federal democracies than in centralized ones, but that the level of corruption is the same in both institutional designs. His study also shows that corrupt governors are replaced less often than corrupt presidents in federal democracies. Among other topics, he has also investigated how leaders' valence affect accountability; how the allocation property rights can prompt citizens to hold their leaders accountable; how conservatives and liberals have innate differences that impact how they seek to optimize performance in non-ideological cognitive tasks; homicides prevention through intelligent policing; and how electoral rules affect polarization. At NYU, he has served as Teacher Assistant for American Politics and American Constitutional Law.

Jeff03.JPGJeff Carnegie

Jeff Carnegie is a PhD Candidate at New York University’s Wilf Family Department of Politics. He completed his thesis defense on Sept. 8, 2016. His research focuses on conflict and leadership models. His dissertation, “Military Resource Division and its Effects on International Conflict,” examines how dyadic dependence such as the number of simultaneous wars affects conflict decisions. The study finds significant network effects that change with time, polarity, and region. Jeff suggests easy ways to include these dependencies in statistical models of war. This research contributes to the growing debate about the role of the dyadic independence assumption in conflict analysis, and challenges assertions that conflicts are rational calculations independent of culture. Another paper, “War and Negotiation in Two Dimensions”, shows how to picture rational war as sets of possible and agreeable sets of settlements, and how the negotiation process can lead to war. Jeff uses selectorate-style leadership models to examine how the provision of various goods differs between regime types. He has shown how natural resources, autocracy, and political volatility result in more barriers to entry for businesses. He has examined why genocide is more common in dictatorships. In “Crime Equilibria and the Rule of Law”, he models the existence of a crime poverty trap and shows how a democracy can fail to provide adequate law enforcement if criminal are sufficiently influential. Jeff has taught introductory statistics for graduate and undergraduates, and believes in applying education research to engage students and stimulate critical thinking. He is prepared to teach statistics, including advanced methods such as network analysis and event history analysis, introductory game theory, and international relations, particularly regarding conflict and war.

photo.JPGLivio Di Lonardo

Livio Di Lonardo is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics at New York University. His main areas of research are political economy and international relations, with a focus on the politics of terrorism prevention and national security. Using a series of formal models, his research studies how terrorism violence and threats affect democratic institutions, processes, and decisions. First, in a paper revised and resubmitted to Political Science Research and Methods, he analyzes how terrorist attacks affect the provision of counterterrorism policies and electoral outcomes based on the target government’s partisan affiliation. Second, he assess how the potential factionalization and internal divisions within terrorist groups fundamentally alter the effectiveness of various foreign policy strategies at deterring terrorist activities. Third, he investigates the existence of a trade-off between deterrence of terrorist activities and informational flows from capturing terrorist operatives affects the dynamics of terrorism prevention. Finally, he shows how increased salience of terrorism as an electoral issue leads to less rather then more congruence between citizens’ preferences and enacted counterterrorism measures. He is currently conducting research aimed at understanding the strategic determinants behind the decision of terrorist groups to enter the electoral arena and of political parties to create military wings. Livio has also written on electoral competition and candidate entry, and his work is forthcoming in the Journal of Theoretical Politics.

ehret_soenke.jpgSönke Ehret

Sönke Ehret is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Politics Department at New York University. He specializes in Comparative Politics, Behavioral Political Economy Experiments and Political Methodology, with focus on the United States and Europe. Using theory and experiments, his dissertation on policy feedback effects examines how individual preferences translate into political choices. He finds that cognition and the information environment, affected through policies and institutions, can effectively reverse the direction of social emancipation preferences. Discrimination under privilege uncertainty becomes infeasible, relative need implies redistribution for the wealthy, and electoral systems dampen national pride despite a uniform national citizenry. Sönke also has research works in political psychology, comparative political economy, and political experimental methods. His agenda includes the design and implementation of novel virtual laboratory (field in the lab) experiments. His future work will be on political reflection, ideology and representation. Sönke is currently an affiliate at both the NYU Center for Experimental Social Science and the NYU Abu Dhabi Social Science Experimental Laboratory. He is also working as a Quantitative Consultant at NYU Data Services and as Editorial Assistant for the Journal of Experimental Political Science. He has teaching experience in Experimental Methods for testing Formal Models and Comparative Political Economy at the graduate level, and at the undergraduate level in American Politics, Pre-Law, Quantitative Methods, Public Opinion and Game Theory.

saad_gulzar1.jpgSaad Gulzar

Saad Gulzar is a Ph.D. candidate in Politics at NYU. He uses field experiments and data from government programs to study the political economy of development and comparative politics. His research focuses on South Asia, including Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka. In a forthcoming article in the American Political Science Review, he builds and analyses a new dataset on half a million villages across India to show that successful implementation of one of the world’s largest development programs - the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme - depends on whether politicians are able to internalize electoral benefits. More recently, in a field experiment with 9,300 subjects across 192 villages in Pakistan, he shows that social incentives shape who decides to run for political office. Subjects are more likely to contest elections when others know that they are running for pro-social reasons. On the contrary, they run less often if others know they are motivated by status and personal benefits from office. Saad is a founding co-convener of the Northeast Workshop in Empirical Political Science, a student fellow at the Association for Analytical Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies, a graduate fellow at the Center for Economic Research in Pakistan, and an affiliate of the Consortium for Development Policy Research. Before graduate school, he was a Pakistan economist at the International Growth Center.

Harris.jpegAdam Harris

Adam Harris received his Ph.D. from New York University in August 2015 and is currently a Post-Doctoral Fellow with the Governance and Local Development (GLD) program at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He specializes in ethnic politics, political behavior, and African politics. In his dissertation, he seeks to understand why some voters (up to 52% of African voters) do not support their ethnic group’s party and to identify swing voters in Africa's "ethnic census" elections. He develops and measures the concept of ethnic proximity that moves beyond the academic convention of co-ethnicity to more fully consider the complex role ethnicity plays in political preference formation. The dissertation argues that the degree to which ethnic group membership influences political preferences is determined by one’s position in her ethnic group, which is in turn determined by her ethnic attributes (or how closely she approximates the group prototype). The dissertation uses original panel survey and experimental data to test the effect of ethnic proximity on voter preferences in South Africa's 2014 National and 2016 Local elections. The results are also replicated in the US and Ugandan contexts. In short, his dissertation concludes that those who are less proximate to their own group and more proximate to an out-group are more likely to be swing voters and will be less likely to vote for their ethnic group’s party. Adam has also conducted research on ethnic identifiability (published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution), anti-immigrant prejudice in the developing world (under review), the preferences for foreign aid in recipient countries (under review), ideological ideal point estimation among African legislators, and the determinants of political protests. His research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, NYU, Columbia University, and GLD.

Hande.jpgHande Mutlu-Eren

Hande Mutlu-Eren completed her Ph.D. in Politics at NYU in 2011 and is currently teaching several undergraduate and graduate courses in comparative politics and political economy at NYU and Columbia University. Between 2010 and 2014 she was a Fellow in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics. Hande specializes in comparative politics and political economy focusing on comparative political institutions, party competition, coalitions, and national and local governments. Her doctoral research explores, using game theoretic models and quantitative methods, the conditions under which a sizable faction decides to break away from a party in parliamentary systems (published in Public Choice), the conditions under which party members decide to replace their leader (revise and resubmit received from the Journal of Theoretical Politics), and the link between cabinet duration and cabinet reshuffles (under review). In a recent article (published in the Journal of Politics) she shows that in political systems with party-centered elections parties use intergovernmental transfers to advance their electoral fortunes via performance spillovers across different levels of government. Hande’s current research examines the impact of supranational integration such as the European Union on party system polarization (under review). In a second line of research, she analyzes whether the procedures for party leadership changes and their timing affect parties’ electoral performance.

Other projects that Hande is working on include a book manuscript on party splits, aiming at providing a comprehensive account of endogenous party splits in advanced industrialized countries as well as a paper on the politics of opposition where she explores the different ways in which opposition parties can influence policy and constrain government parties from gaining too much control over minorities. She has additional work on government formation, cabinet dynamics in Turkey, and networks, which has appeared in Public Choice, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and as a chapter in a book. Hande is prepared to teach courses in comparative politics, political economy, European politics, Middle Eastern politics, as well as formal models and quantitative research methods.

Profile_Park.JPGJu Yeon Park

Ju Yeon Park is a lecturer of the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University and a research associate of the Social Science Experimental Laboratory at NYU Abu Dhabi. She received her Ph.D. in Politics at NYU in 2015 specializing in American politics and experimental methods. Her research interest lies in legislative behavior, electoral behavior, political psychology, and experimental political economy. Using game-theoretic models and lab experiments, her dissertation investigates how political and institutional factors affect types of information transmitted in congressional hearings by focusing on the strategic selection of witnesses. Her research is the first to model the internal decision-making process within a committee over hearings and politicians’ incentives to grandstand. She finds that political polarization hinders information transmission in public hearings. One of her dissertation chapters is forthcoming at Legislative Studies Quarterly (paper). Currently she is working on a text analytic project on congressional hearings and two experimental projects to test formal models of strategic communication and voting among the voters with asymmetric information. Her latest research also involves multilevel survey analyses: one finds that the asymmetry in economic voting does exist and is stronger among out-partisans than in-partisans (paper); the other finds that economic voting strengthens as the class and partisans are dealigned (paper). She has previously taught American politics, international relations, research methods, and quantitative analysis at NYU and Columbia University. At Rutgers, she is teaching Maximum Likelihood Estimation for doctoral students and political psychology, international relations, and political methods for undergraduates.

Didac.jpegDidac Queralt

Since October 2015, Didac Queralt is a Junior Research Professor at the Institute of Political Economy and Governance in Barcelona. Before that, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Juan March Institute in Madrid. Didac received his Ph.D. from the NYU Politics Department in 2012. His research, which lies at the intersection of comparative and international political economy, examines the origins of fiscal capacity and its lasting effects on political representation from three different angles: war, trade, and political competition. First, building on Charles Tilly's work, he pins down the conditions under which inter-state war leads to state building around the globe. He argues that war is not as important as the way it is financed. To test this proposition and address endogeneity concerns, he relies on international financial collapses in the long-nineteenth century. Results show that tax-financed war does makes states, while debt-financed war does not. You can find the job market paper here. Second, using game theoretical and quantitative methods, he claims that tariff protection may be exchanged for tax compliance by key domestic producers. He shows evidence of this exchange in pre-modern Europe and the developing world today. This work implies that protection is not always for sale, but might be for tax compliance. You can find his research on this topic here and here. Third, using nineteenth-century archival data on tax and electoral returns, he finds that modern taxation in Western Europe does not result from inter-class redistribution (or threats from below), but from strategic moves by incumbent elites to delay political and economic change. You can find a collection of these papers  here, here and here. Didac’s research has appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, and is conditionally accepted in the International Studies Quarterly. Currently, he is drafting a book manuscript that traces the legacy of warfare on fiscal capacity and limited government.

sexton_photo.jpegRenard Sexton

Renard Sexton is a PhD candidate in Politics at NYU (defending Spring 2017). He studies the political economy of conflict using field experimental and rigorous observational methods. In particular, his work explores how local political institutions determine how external shocks and interventions affect local level conflict. In a forthcoming article in the American Political Science Review, for example, he shows that multi-million dollar aid distributions by pro-government forces in Afghanistan increase violence in contested districts, but decreases violence in districts already controlled by counter-insurgents. Renard’s current research examines how electoral accountability and government capacity moderate the effect of commodity price shocks on extractive industries-related violence in Peru. He is conducting a companion field experiment in Peru to determine whether village-level trainings can improve the accountability and performance of local elected officials and if this has conflict-mitigating consequences. He is co-founder of the Northeastern Workshop in Empirical Political Science (NEWEPS), a junior fellow at the Association for Analytical Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies (AALIMS). He has experience teaching comparative politics and international relations at an undergraduate level and quantitative methods at a graduate level.

IMG_3525.JPGGabor Simonovits

Gabor Simonovits is a PhD Candidate in Politics at NYU (defending in June 2017). His current research, situated in the intersection of public opinion and political economy, studies the interrelationship between mass opinion and public policy. In his dissertation, Public Opinion, and Redistributive Policies, Gabor uses survey data on preferences about tax progressivity and the minimum wage to describe the representation of mass opinion in redistributive policies in American states. Gabor finds evidence that contrary to existing empirical research, while policy outcomes are related to public opinion across states, they exhibit a conservative bias within states and in general are far from the outcomes preferred by most citizens. Beyond his dissertation, Gabor has published papers on diverse topics including electoral politics, political extremism, and quantitative methodology. These papers have appeared in Science, the Journal of Politics, Political Behavior, and Political Analysis, among other places.

forwebsite-603x904.jpgEmily Anne West

Emily Anne West is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Politics at New York University. Her research fits into both the American and Comparative fields, focusing on Political Psychology, Race, Ethnicity and Gender, as well as Experimental Methods. Using experimental, survey and historical data, her research explores the democratic implications of identity politics in two ways. She first focuses on how historical marginalization along racial, ethnic, and gender lines affects the political behavior of individuals from these groups. In the context of race and gender in the U.S., she uses a series of experiments (registered with EGAP) to demonstrate the psychological benefit to ingroup voting. In a forthcoming article in The Journal of Politics, she also explores how descriptive representation along racial and gender lines affects political efficacy among American voters. In a Comparative context, she shows, with Professor Cyrus Samii, that repressed productive potential resulting from ethnic discrimination can motivate participation in violent insurgency. In her second line of research, she studies the different ways that discrimination manifests in the political process and affects outcomes for constituents. By counting the frequency with which female and minority legislators are interrupted in the Congressional Record, she explores how such officeholders are able to affect legislative debate. Using text-analysis, she explores other aspects of their role in the deliberative process and how they are able to influence the implementation of substantively representative policies for their shared-identity constituents. She also examines (with Professor Anna Harvey) the impacts of racial discrimination on economic well-being using historical medical records from Union Army Data. Emily will be an adjunct instructor at the Wagner Graduate School of Public Service for the 2016-2017 academic year teaching a methodological course on estimating causal impacts.