

Domestic Determinants of International Relations.

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Tuesday 9:30-12:00

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(or by appointment)

Brief Description.

Domestic political circumstances affect the policy incentives of leaders. Hence domestic political institutions, economic performance and popularity all influence foreign policy. In turn, international outcomes influence the domestic survival of leaders. This seminar explores the theoretical linkages between domestic and international events. During the seminar we will focus on the theoretical explanations and the empirical evidence used to support these hypotheses. The readings should be considered in this light. Rather than simply reading each work at face value, a primary goal is uncovering the exact relationship that each author characterizes and then to evaluate whether the evidence supports or falsifies their claims

Requirements and grading

All students are expected to come to class and have done the readings. In addition students are expected to present the readings. Although the number of reading will vary with the exact enrolment, I envision that students should expect to present two or three times during the semester. These presentations should take the form of a 10 to 15 minutes summary of the reading. Presentations should include consideration of the following questions: 1) What does the author seek to explain (the dependent variable)? 2) How does he or she measure this dependent variable? 3) What is the author's explanation for the variance in the dependent variable? 4) What predictions does the author generate (the relationship between independent, or explanatory, variables and the dependent variable)? 5) What evidence would support the author's predictions? What would falsify them? 6) What evidence does the author provide?

In addition to these presentations, students are expected to write a term paper and 5 additional "think pieces." These "think pieces" should be around 2 pages long and discuss how the research in the readings could be improved or extended. They should not be a simple summary. However, beyond these criteria students are free to write on any topic they wish. The term paper should represent further developments of a think piece. As you will note in the schedule, I have left one session free for students to present their ideas for their term paper. For this class students should prepare a brief summary and be prepared to present their idea for about 10mins. I hope this session will provide valuable feedback and help sharpen projects.

The term paper is due in my mailbox in 726 Broadway (7th floor) by 12 noon on Friday May 4th. *This deadline is final and non-negotiable. Late papers will result in a grade F.* I can not stress too much how strict I am at imposing this standard! The dog eating your paper, family crises or your hard drive crashing are all legitimate reasons for being late, but if you choose to leave the paper until the last minute then you must endogenize these risks. The think pieces should be given to me at the start of the relevant class (preferably a few hours earlier so that I

have an opportunity to read them before class). You may only write one think piece per week I have specified dates by which think pieces need to be written. I want think pieces written about the current week's readings. Hence if you hand a piece in for week three, then the think piece should be about the week three readings. *The deadlines for think pieces are firm and final.* I will subtract 5% from your final grade for *each* week that *any* think piece is late. You may, of course, hand in think pieces in advance of deadlines. For example, you might write a think piece for each of the first five weeks and be finished with that requirement. As a practical matter these think pieces are a useful way to start thinking about your term paper.

The final paper represents 40% of the overall grade, think pieces make up 30% (i.e., 6% each) of the final grade and presentations account for remaining 30%.

Topics

Democracies are Different: The Democratic Peace

1) An Empirical Law? Democracies don't fight each other!

Ray. 1995. *Democracy and International Peace* Chaps 1, 3.

Russett 1993 *Grasping the Democratic peace*. Chapt. 1, 2 and skim 4.

Gowa 1999 *Ballots and Bullets* Chapt. 1, 2, 7 .

2) Internal Institutions Affect How Nations Fight.

Reiter and Stam 1999 *Democracies at War*.

3) Theoretical Explanations of the Democratic Peace and War Aims.

Rosato 2003. Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003 "Logic of Political Survival" Chapters 2,3,6

4) Peaceful Democratization?

Mansfield and Snyder 2005

First think piece to have been completed by now!

5) Audience costs and the survival of political leaders.

Goemans 2000; Fearon 1994;

6) Cooperation, Credibility and Borrowing

Axelrod & Keohane 1985. Schultz and Weingast. 1997. Stasavage Ch. 1

7) Intergroup communication and cooperation

Fearon and Laitin. 1996. McGillivray and Smith 2001;

Second think piece to have been completed by now!

8) International Dimensions of Internal Conflict

Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lake and Rothchild 1996. Walter 1997.

9) Sanctions

Drezner 2002; McGillivray and Stam 2003

Third think piece to have been completed by now!

10) Diversionary War Theory: Theory and case studies.
Norpoth 1991; Smith 1996; Gaubatz 1991

11) International Negotiations
Putnam 1988
Fourth think piece to have been written by now!

12) Student Presentations of Papers.

13) Foreign Aid, Humanitarian Issues and Nation Building.
Comparison of FDI to aid distribution
Alesina and Dollar 2000. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2006.

TBA Final think piece to have been written by now.

Readings

I have ordered the following books at the book store.

Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam. 2002. *Democracies at War*. Princeton University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder. 2005. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*.

Drezner, Daniel W. 1999. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge University Press.

Reader (available at the copy shop on Waverley, just West of Mercer):

Ray, James Lee 1995. *Democracies in International Conflict* University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC.

Russett, Bruce 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gowa, Joanne. 1999. *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*. Princeton University Press

Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 585-602.

H. E. Goemans. 2000. Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 44, No. 5. (Oct., 2000), pp. 555-579.

Fearon, James. 1994. "Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88(Sept.): 577-92.

Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," *World Politics* 38 (1985):226-54.

Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. Limited Government and Powerful States. In *Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy*. (Ed.) Randolph Siverson. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Stasavage, David. 2003. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain 1688-1789*. Cambridge University Press.

Fearon and Laitin. 1996 "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90,4(1996):715-735.

McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. *Trust and Cooperation through Agent Specific*

- Punishments*. International Organization 54(4): 809-824.
- Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97,1(2003):75-90.
- Lake and Rothchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21,2(1996):41-75.
- Walter, Barbara. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*. 51,3(1997):335-364.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Allan Stam. 2004 "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy and the Duration of Sanctions", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 No. 2, April 2004 154-172
- Norpoth, Helmet. 1991. The Falklands War and British Public Opinion. In *International Crisis and Domestic Politics* (ed) James W. Lamare. New York: Praeger.
- Smith, Alastair 1996. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems" *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 133-153.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz 1991. Election Cycles and War *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2., pp. 212-244.
- Robert D. Putnam 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460.
- Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5: 33-63 (March 2000)
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith 2006. A Political Economy of Aid. Working paper.

Dates, Jan 16,23,30 Feb 6,13,20,27, Mar 6, 20,27, April 3,10,17,24,