

# War, Peace, and World Order

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Fall 2008

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Monday/Wednesday 11:00-12:15

Office hours: Wednesday 9-12 (or by appointment)

Room 406, 19 W 4<sup>th</sup> St

This course explores the conditions that lead to the initiation, escalation, spread, termination, and consequences of international conflict as well as the circumstances that promote, preserve, or restore peace. The main objective is to identify strategies that promote cooperative solutions to international disputes and to evaluate those strategies in terms of their historical effectiveness. The course emphasizes the application of models of strategic rational action as tools for assessing relations between nations, coupled with statistical and historical analysis of classes of events. No mathematics beyond high school math is needed for this course although comfort with mathematical reasoning is important. Class sessions will build on and expand beyond the readings, reflecting both deeper exploration of the readings and application to current events around the world. Therefore, I anticipate lively discussion and efforts to relate theoretical ideas to current circumstances.

This class is not intended as a comprehensive survey. The emphasis is on evaluating and testing theory. I expect you to consider the implications of theoretical arguments and use these deductions to make predictions. We will not simply be reading theoretical arguments, but rather we will consider what each theory implies and what evidence would falsify or support the predictions. *The exams and grading will reflect these goals.*

There will be a mid-term and a final examination. The midterm will serve as a means for the student to receive feedback on how s/he is doing in the course. Because the class is expected to be large, it is unfortunately not possible to count class participation toward the grade. The final exam is Monday 12/15 10:00AM-11:50AM and the midterm is during class on Wednesday October 29th. You are expected to attend all exams. Please let me know immediately if this exam schedule poses any problems.

The core readings for the course are: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (hereafter BDM&L), *War and Reason* and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (hereafter BdM2S2), *The Logic of Political Survival*. As should be obvious from the required books, the course will not be a survey course but rather will be a more advanced undergraduate class that emphasizes a particular way to think about war, peace, and world order. I assume that everyone has had the prerequisite core course in international relations and so is familiar with the main contending approaches to the subject. These other approaches will, of course, be utilized from time to time in examining specific issues.

I have intentionally kept the amount of reading each week fairly modest. The two required books and the occasional required articles are what I call desk reading, not couch reading. That is, some pages may require very close reading and are not amenable to skimming. Because I have not assigned a great deal of reading, I expect that you will come to class having read and studied the assignments and prepared to discuss the material.

### Exams and Grading

There will be a mid term and a final exam. The mid term exams will be in class on is worth 35% of the final grade. The final exam accounts for the remaining 65% of the grade. The final exam is Monday 12/15 10:00AM-11:50AM. You are expected to attend all exams. Please let me know immediately if this exam schedule poses any problems.

### Readings The required books for this class are:

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press. (BDM2S2)

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (hereafter BDM&L), *War and Reason* 1992. Yale University Press.

### **Reader**

Hempel, Carl 1966. "Philosophy of Natural Science" Chapters 2&3.

Kenneth Waltz, *Stability of the Bipolar System*

Deutsch and Singer, *Multipolar power systems ...*

Morgenthau, *The Balance of Power*;

Organski, *Criticism of BOP....*

Kugler and Organski 1993. *The Power Transition in Midlarsky's Handbook of War Studies*

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war" *International Organization*. v. 49 Summer '95 p. 379-414.

Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5: 33-63.

Easterly, William. 2002. "The cartel of good intentions: the problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid" *Journal of Policy Reform*, 5(4): 223-250.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs "Intervention and Democracy" *International Organization* 60, Summer 2006, p. 627-649

Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. 2000. Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5: 33-63 (March 2000)

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith 2006. *A Political Economy of Aid* available at <http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/smith/FinalAidSelectorateSept2006.pdf>

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and George Downs. 2005. *Nation Building*. Manuscript.

Robert Axelrod; Robert O. Keohane. 1985. *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions*. *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Oct., 1985), pp. 226-254.

Putnam, Robert. *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of two-level games*. *International Organizations* 1988.

## Syllabus

- 1) (W 9/4) Does the number of golf courses really influence international conflict? The need for a theoretical explanation. (Hempel, Chap 2,3). Listen to the following podcast about Karl Popper: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime\\_20070208.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20070208.shtml).
  - 2) (M 9/8) Theory and Marxism
  - 3) (W 9/10) Realism. The security dilemma. Balance of Power. [Kenneth Waltz, Stability of the Bipolar System; Deutsch and Singer, Multipolar power systems ... Morgenthau, The Balance of Power; Organski, Criticism of BOP...]. Power transition theory (Read Kugler and Organski)
  - 4) (M 9/15) Expected Utility Theories of war involvement (3<sup>rd</sup> party intervention).
  - 5) (W 9/17) Bargaining in crises: Why negotiations fail in take it or leave it bargaining. (Fearon 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war")
  - 6) (M 9/22) Game Theory I: The initiation of conflict. Chicken, PD.
  - 7) (W 9/24) Game Theory II: Nuclear confrontation and credibility
  - 8) (M 9/29) The international interactions game. BdM&L, Chapter 2
  - 9) (W 10/1) The Causes of War: Uncertainty and Domestic Demands BdM&L p 53-92.
  - 10) (M 10/6) An explanation of Why (i.e. When) Realism works.
  - 11) (W 10/8) Dr Strangelove.
  - 12) (W 10/15) Politics: The Democratic Peace. An inductive research agenda. The findings?
  - 13) (M 10/20) Theoretical models of the democratic peace I (BdM2S2 chapters 2,3, 6)
  - 14) (W 10/22) Who wins war? Theoretical models of the democratic peace, part 2.
  - 15) (M 10/27) Testing theories of the democratic peace. (BdM2S2 chapter 9).
  - 16) (W 10/29) Mid term exam
  - 17) (M 11/3) Voting Cycles in Foreign Policy
  - 18) (W 11/5) Foreign Aid – Who gets it? Does it relieve suffering? (Alesina & Dollar 2000, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2006)
  - 19) (M 11/10) The bureaucratic politics of aid. (Easterly 2002).
  - 20) (W 11/12) Nation Building I (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006)
  - 21) (M 11/17) Nation Building II
  - 22) (W 11/19) Terrorism
  - 23) (M 11/24) Negotiations (Putnam 1988)
  - 24) (W 11/26) Selection effects and the reliability of alliances.
- Thursday 27<sup>th</sup> November: Thanksgiving
- 25) (M 12/1) The use and success of international sanctions
  - 26) (W 12/3) Arms races
  - 27) (M 12/8) Current events/ catch-up
  - 28) (W 12/10) Current events/ catch-up
- Final Exam: Monday 12/15 10:00AM-11:50AM