

# PARTY COHESION, PARTY DISCIPLINE, PARTY FACTIONS IN ITALY

Daniela Giannetti  
University of Bologna  
[daniela.giannetti@unibo.it](mailto:daniela.giannetti@unibo.it)

Michael Laver  
New York University  
[michael.laver@nyu.edu](mailto:michael.laver@nyu.edu)

Draft October 2007

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Joint Workshop Sessions  
of the European Consortium for Political Research: Granada, 13-19 April 2005.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Theoretical models of party competition often treat political parties as “unitary” actors. Real political parties are collectivities – coalitions of political agents who have something in common, at the very least a party label. In this important sense, political parties are endogenous – *outputs* of political competition as much as *inputs* to it. This means we must explain why, in practice, members of a political party often behave in a cohesive and/or disciplined way so that, to an outside observer, the party behaves “as if” it is a unitary actor.

Seeking an answer to this question here, we explore the cohesion and discipline of political parties in parliamentary democracies with multi-dimensional, multi-party competition (MDMPC). We do this by adapting and extending arguments developed for the more tractable setting of two-party competition in a one-dimensional policy space under a separation-of-powers regime (which we can think of, substantively, as like the US Congress.). Systematic consideration of party cohesion and discipline forces us to be precise about our unit of analysis. In general theoretical terms, the basic unit of analysis is an autonomous decision-making agent – an individual politician or citizen. In the real political world, however, it is often difficult to discuss the making and breaking of parties without referring to intra-party “factions” or groupings of some shape or form. Accounts of *intra-party* politics are often, in practice, accounts of *inter-factional* politics.

Building on this observed empirical regularity, we describe the intra-party politics that drives the making and breaking of parties in terms of inter-factional competition. We then illustrate this account using an example from Italy, where a pervasive empirical pattern of legislators switching party affiliations highlights the endogeneity of political parties. We focus on the important Italian left-wing party *Sinistra Democratica /Democratic Left* (DS), which has a well-documented factional structure. We characterize this factional structure in a number of different ways, including: observed patterns of support for motions at party congresses; policy positions estimated from political speeches; roll call voting behavior on key foreign policy issues.

## 2. COHESION AND/OR DISCIPLINE?

Party *cohesion* is best thought of as an emergent “bottom up” phenomenon – reflecting congruent behavior patterns that arise in some way from interactions between individual politicians. Party *discipline*, in contrast, is a “top down” phenomenon – the outcome of a strategic game played within the party in which rank and file members respond to rewards and punishments created by some internal party decision-making regime.<sup>1</sup>

The vast bulk of scholarly debate on party cohesion and discipline deals with roll-call voting behavior of members of the US Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 1993; Aldrich 1995; Krehbiel 1998; Krehbiel 1999; Nokken 2000; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Snyder and Ting 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Explanations of this typically concern *electoral* incentives deriving from the information value of the party label, or *legislative* incentives deriving from the enhanced expectations of diverse legislative payoffs arising from coordinated behavior.

### **The electoral value of a party label to *candidates***

The electoral value to candidates of being associated with a party label derives from an assumed or observed situation in which electors factor candidates’ policy positions into their voting decisions, but are imperfectly informed about these positions. Electors are further assumed to be more inclined to update on the basis of what candidates actually do (joining a political party with a well-known policy position), rather than what they say will do (issuing a statement making some policy promises). Building on analyses of party-free electoral competition between “citizen-candidates” (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997), Snyder and Ting develop an argument, extended by Levy, whereby electors treat candidates’ party affiliations as costly signals about their policy positions, ignoring as cheap talk anything a candidate might actually say (Snyder and Ting 2002; Levy 2004). If parties’ policy positions are influenced in some way by the policy preferences of all party members, then candidates, whose fates are inextricably bound up with the policy position of their party, prefer to join parties comprising colleagues with similar preferences. This in turn implies that electors can draw useful inferences about candidates’ policy preferences by observing which parties they join.

---

<sup>1</sup> And, potentially, a “meta-regime” under which the party’s decision-making regime is selected.

Despite occasional casual references to “party discipline”, this account involves no explicit model of intra-party politics and therefore of party discipline in the strict sense. It is also assumed that politicians can both join and stay in any party they choose. The only “filter” on party entry arises from party policy itself which, combined with obvious deadweight costs of party membership, discourages candidates with very divergent policy positions from joining the same party (Snyder and Ting 2002: 95).

While the substantive setting of discussions electoral incentives for party cohesion is typically the US Congress, there is no obvious reason why such incentives should differ in the more general context of MDMPC. If it is plausible to assume electors are under-informed about candidates’ policy positions in the simple setting of two-party one-dimensional competition, this seems no less, and arguably more, plausible when several different dimensions of policy are important and several different parties contest the election. Once we establish that party labels are valuable *electoral* assets, we can explain party *cohesion* in MDMPC along lines discussed by Snyder and Ting (2002). What is important, as we shall see, is that this explanation comes from outside the *legislative* game. If we add the empirically realistic assumption that *politicians can be exiled from political parties* and thereby alienated from the benefits of membership, then we can also build an account of electoral incentives for top-down party *discipline*, enforced by threats by party leaders to withdraw the party label from undisciplined party members.

### **Benefits to legislators of coordinated behavior**

A second set of incentives for legislators to affiliate to political parties characterizes parties as cartels of legislators, or voting blocs, and concerns payoffs arising within the legislature that accrue to legislators who belong to larger rather than smaller cartels. A large part of the relevant literature has been concerned with (relatively undisciplined) parties in the US Congress; Cox and McCubbins provide a comprehensive overview of this (Cox and McCubbins 2005). At a mundane but nonetheless important level, the legislature is where legislators go to work, valuing legislative “perquisites” that can include matters such as office space, as well as administrative, research and PR resources. Moving on to “official” politics, legislators also value paid positions as committee chairs, scarce speaking time in debates, and so on. Invariably, perks are first allocated *between*

legislative parties, before being allocated *within* parties. As a rule, therefore, belonging to some legislative party makes life a lot more rewarding for most legislators, while being exiled to the extra-party wilderness is severe punishment indeed – a conclusion that holds as much for European-style parliamentary democracies with MDMPC as for US-style separation of powers regimes.

Moving beyond “mere” perquisites, Cox and McCubbins (2005) base much of their argument on legislative agenda control. This is an important resource that can be captured by a majority coalition of legislators and affects both the content of public policy and the contents of the pork barrel. Within the US Congress, control over the legislative agenda is achieved via agenda-setting positions such as committee chairs (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). Authority to fill these positions is monopolized by party leaders who, on this argument, fill positions in a way that enhances realization of the party policy position – which in turn feeds back to enhance the electoral value of the party label. On this argument, each party is a putative *majority* coalition, a premise more compelling for two- than for multi-party legislatures. In parliamentary systems such as Britain, where there is typically a *single-party* majority government, the argument that parties, *per se*, deliver legislative benefits arising from agenda control generalizes in a straightforward way, substituting cabinet portfolios for committee chairs. In multi-party systems where *coalition* cabinets are the norm, however, the argument that parties enhance agenda control needs to be augmented with evidence and/or assumptions about ways in which, during bargaining over government formation, agenda control resources such as cabinet portfolios are first allocated between leaders of government parties and then allocated by leaders within their own parties. This seems a perfectly reasonable assumption, suggesting that we can extend the agenda control rationale for party discipline to a setting with MDMPC.

The Cox-McCubbins argument that US party leaders impose top-down discipline by manipulating scarce agenda-control resources has been contested by Keith Krehbiel (1993, 1998), who argues that what looks superficially like *discipline* is essentially emergent bottom-up party *cohesion*. For Krehbiel, such “party-esque” behavior arises because legislators choose a party to affiliate to on the basis of their intrinsic policy preferences. A party is seen as little more than a collection of like-minded legislators who

voluntarily behave in the same way, with no need for an externally imposed “party effect”. The question that remains to be answered in this event, of course, is why any legislator would choose to join any party or, minimally, to accept some party label.

One answer to this question may be found in a characterization of parties as endogenously emerging legislative voting blocs. Jackson and Moselle (p70) model a political party as “a binding agreement among its members to act as one player in the legislative game. That is, they can commit each to follow the same single action when recognized, and to approve each other's proposals” (Jackson and Moselle 2002). To see a party as an exogenously enforced binding agreement between legislators is of course to see a party as “an organization that is external to the [legislative] game and through rewards and punishments can enforce behavior that would otherwise not be observed in the game” (Jackson and Moselle 2002: 69). Given an external rationale for political parties that offer members valuable benefits (perhaps the electoral benefits discussed above), agreements between party legislators can then be made and enforced, including agreements to vote in ways that systematically enhance their expectations. The assumed exogenous top-down enforcement of agreements between party members makes this a model of party *discipline* as opposed to bottom-up party *cohesion*.

While Jackson and Moselle deal with a simple *one*-dimensional, *two*-party, *three-legislator* case, the argument is taken a step further by Jon Eguia, who models a one-dimensional setting with an arbitrary number of legislators and potential parties, and is interested in explaining the emergence of political parties as endogenous voting blocs (Eguia 2007). These voting blocs are legislative coalitions that use some internal decision rule (such a simple- or super-majority voting) to determine how all bloc members will vote. Members who join the bloc, by implication constituting a political party or faction, can in certain situations increase their expectations if they commit to voting according to bloc decisions and do not renege on this commitment.<sup>2</sup> Key intuitions from this work are that: submission to disciplined enforceable coordination can increase expectations of legislators; the precise internal decision rule used a voting bloc/party to determine the coordinated behavior affects its coherence, stability and/or discipline.

---

<sup>2</sup> This lack of renegeing is left unexplained by Eguia but, as with the argument by Jackson and Moselle, we can think of the enforcement of intra-party deals in terms of the manipulation of exclusive party resources, such as the electoral party brand, derived from outside the legislative game.

### **Making and breaking governments**

All arguments thus far assume the main job of legislators is legislating. In a parliamentary democracy, however, the main job for legislators is *not* legislating, but making and breaking governments. This derives from the binding constitutional requirement that the executive gains and retains office as long as it maintains the confidence of the legislature, institutionally realized in the parliamentary vote of confidence/no confidence in the government (Huber 1996; Lijphart 1992, 1999). The stability and effectiveness of governments depend on whether the leaders of government parties can maintain disciplined behavior by legislators. While the vote of no confidence is the *constitutional* underpinning of parliamentary government, the *behavioral* underpinning is party discipline. This generates big incentives for senior party politicians, often members of the government themselves, to maintain firm control over party members.

Given this overwhelming *incentive* to maintain firm party discipline in parliamentary democracies, party leaders derive the *ability* to achieve this from many sticks and carrots at their disposal. These include some we have already discussed: control over valuable party labels and control over sought-after perks in the legislature. But the incentive structure has an important new dimension under parliamentary government, arising from the fact that the *legislature typically functions as a recruitment pool for the executive*, while the career ambition of many legislators in such systems is to hold high government office. (This and other aspects of the agency relationship between members of parliament and government ministers in parliamentary democracies are discussed by Saalfeld, 2000). All of this means that maintaining tight party discipline is highly incentive-compatible for party leaders under parliamentary democracy. They must maintain party discipline if they want to keep hold of their positions in the government – or if they want to challenge successfully for these positions from the opposition benches. At the same time, control of the government gives access to very valuable resources: senior government jobs that can be allocated to reward disciplined party members. Indeed party leaders have huge incentives to perpetuate this incentive structure by confining jobs in the government to legislators, whose disciplined behavior is so vital, rather than distributing these jobs more promiscuously.

### 3. FACTIONS AND INTRA-PARTY POLITICS

We noted in the introduction that it is hard to give an empirically realistic account of party cohesion and discipline without talking about intra-party factions. Rather little has been written about party factions in general, although considerable attention has been paid to the impact of factional politics in particular parties – especially the Christian Democrats (DC) in Italy (Mershon 2001; Mershon 2001) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan (Leiserson 1968; Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 2000; Bouissou 2001) In these two cases in particular, the factional structure of the party is both very explicit for all to see and clearly central to intra-party politics. In what follows, therefore, we distil some features of these discussions of Italy and, in particular, Japan into a more general characterization of the role of factions in intra-party politics.

A faction is not simply a group of agents within some organization who are similar in some important respect (as are women, for example, or young people). The existence of a faction implies *coordinated behavior by faction members*, whether actual or putative. Perhaps the most obvious example of this arises inside government parties, where *factions structure intra-party distribution of the payoffs of office* – in particular cabinet portfolios and junior ministries. The empirical patterns here are very striking, both in the case of the DC (Mershon 2001) and the LDP (Leiserson 1968; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999; Bouissou 2001). Indeed faction membership in the LDP appears to be a pre-requisite for receiving any serious office payoff (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies, 1999: 35). *Inter-factional* payoff allocations, furthermore, typically conform to a “Gamsonian” proportionality rule (Gamson 1961), as opposed to some alternative measure of bargaining leverage. *Intra-faction* allocation of scarce resources, certainly in Japan, seems to be by a seniority rule (Bouissou 2001), very important since “[a] seniority system for post allocation, which became an integral part of the factional system in the Lower House, gave back benchers enough security to stay in a single faction over the length of their careers” (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies: 2000: 117).

A second striking pattern that emerges in the cases of the DC and LDP is that the *quid pro quo* for the top-down flow of scarce resources is bottom-up support of faction

leaders by rank-and-file members, particularly in struggles for the most senior party positions, including the Prime Ministership.

“In return for help with money, endorsements and posts, factional bosses received their followers’ support in the contest for the LDP presidency (which, given the party’s perennial majority status, automatically conferred the premiership of Japan) ... No LDP president, hence no LDP prime minister of Japan, was without factional affiliation when he took office. ... Sometimes, support was sufficiently taken-for-granted that no actual election was held; the factional chieftains simply bargained among themselves, in the light of their known bloc of votes. At other times factional support was expressed in terms of voting as the factional boss dictated – either in a presidential election or in other skirmishes with prime ministerial implications ...” (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999: 36)

In this context, note that *factions are almost always defined and named in terms of their leaders*. This leads us to a characterization of a faction as the *set of followers of an actual or potential party leader*. There may be other types of group within a political party, but we feel it is useful to reserve the notion of a legislative faction for a group of legislators who are supporters of some actual or putative party leader.

This in turn suggests a third conclusion about the systematic basis of faction membership. If we assume that the policy preferences of a party leader make a difference to the party policy position, then policy preferences will tend to structure faction membership. In the knowledge that a significant obligation of faction membership is to support the faction leader in contests for party leadership positions, a freshman legislator deciding which faction to join should, other things equal, prefer a faction leader with compatible policy preferences. If, in addition, the legislator expects the faction to function as a legislative voting bloc motivated to increase the probability of realizing desired outcomes, then this enhances incentives to join a faction whose leader has similar policy preferences.

The bottom line in all of this is that, if we want to move beyond the unitary actor assumption and incorporate an account of intra-party politics into our models of party competition, then we will almost certainly find it helpful to begin by *modeling intra-party politics in terms of inter-factional competition*, where factions are seen as support coalitions for actual or putative party leaders. In order to put some substantive flesh on this preliminary characterization of the role of party factions in intra-party politics, we now apply the ideas we have been discussing above to an analysis of intra-factional

politics within the Italian DS, a party for which, as we noted above, intra-factional politics is both well-documented and clearly very important.

#### 4. FACTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ITALIAN DS

While left wing parties are often considered more cohesive than others, the recent history of the major Italian left-wing party (the former PCI, then PDS, now DS) involves a series of splits and fusions, both deriving from and resulting in very explicit factional politics within the party. The starting point for analysing this history is 1991, when the PCI (*Partito Comunista/Communist Party*) held its twentieth Congress. In response to an initiative launched by the party leader, Occhetto, to dissociate the Italian left from the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, the PCI changed its name to PDS (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra/Democratic Party of the Left*). A group of dissenters split to form an extreme left party, the PRC (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista/Communist Refoundation Party*). The PDS held two party congresses, the first in 1995 and the second in 1997. While the first congress was mostly devoted to discussing practical party strategies for the coming 1996 national election, debates during the 1997 congress clearly showed the emergence of minority factions inside the party. While only one policy document was debated and only one official candidate ran for party leadership, several amendments to this were presented by both left and right wing minority group leaders.

In February 1998, the PDS held a national party convention (“*Stati Generali della Sinistra*”). Several outside groups entered the party, including: *Laburisti* (a splinter of the former PSI, born in 1994); *Cristiano Sociali* (a splinter of the former DC, born in 1993); *Comunisti Unitari* (a splinter of PRC, born in 1995); and *Sinistra Repubblicana* (a splinter of former PRI). As a result, the party changed its name into DS (*Democratici di Sinistra/Democratic Left*).

The factional structure of the DS can most easily be observed during party congresses, during which debate is organized around comprehensive omnibus motions that are in effect policy documents mapping out the overall ideological orientation of the party. In the four party congresses held by the DS party from 2001 to 2007, there was always a major motion proposed by the official party leadership, as well as one or more rival motions proposed by party factions opposing the leadership. Huge numbers of party

delegates signed one or other of these congress motions, thereby publicly declaring their alignment within the party to the faction proposing the motion they signed. These party factions, however, are not static. DS party congresses show evidence of a continuous regrouping of party members and increasingly open contests for party leadership positions, eventually leading to a fundamental party split in 2007.

The first congress of the DS was held in Torino, 13-15 January 2000. Two alternative motions were debated. The first motion was proposed by the party leader, Veltroni, and was titled “*Una grande sinistra, un grande Ulivo, per un’Italia di tutti*”. The second motion was proposed by the internal leftist component (*Sinistra DS*) and was titled “*Per un partito di sinistra, per una coalizione riformatrice, per rinnovare i valori del socialismo europeo*”. The only official candidate for the party leadership, Veltroni, was elected as party leader with 80 percent of delegates’ votes. New party rules were also approved at this congress, allowing the formation of “political clubs” and thereby officially recognizing the existence of different factions inside the party.

National elections were held in Italy on 13 May 2001, in which the centre-left coalition was defeated and the DS gained 16.6 percent of the popular vote. Later in the same year (16-18 November 2001), a second DS party congress was held in Pesaro. Delegates discussed three motions: (i) “*La sinistra cambia per governare il futuro. Con l’Italia. Nell’Ulivo*” (ii) “*Per tornare a vincere*” (iii) “*Per salvare i DS, consolidare l’Ulivo e costruire un nuovo unitario partito del riformismo socialista*”. The first two were proposed, respectively, by the leadership and the internal left faction; the third was proposed by a new liberal faction that had recently emerged, located to the right of the party leadership. For the first time, there were three candidates for the position of party leader: Piero Fassino, representing the “leadership” faction; Giovanni Berlinguer, endorsed by the “internal left” faction led by Fabio Mussi; Enrico Morando, representing the liberal faction. Fassino was elected leader with 62 percent of the vote, ahead of Berlinguer with 34 percent, and Morando with 4 percent.

The summer of 2003 saw the beginning of an internal debate about the foundation of a new party, the *Partito democratico/Democratic Party* – a fusion between the DS and the centre party DL (*La Margherita-Democrazia è Libertà/Democracy is Freedom* –

*Daisy*). On November 26, senator Cesare Salvi founded a new DS faction, *Sinistra DS per il Socialismo (DS Left for Socialism)*, opposing the creation of the new party.

The third DS congress, held in Rome on February 3-5 2005, was a major step in defining the party leader's strategy to merge the DS into a new party. Four motions were debated. The first, *Per vincere, L'Italia che unisce* was proposed by the leadership faction and endorsed by the liberal faction. The other three were proposed by different party leaders belonging to the internal left: *Una sinistra forte, una grande alleanza democratica* proposed by Fabio Mussi; *A sinistra per il socialismo*, proposed by Cesare Salvi; *L'ecologia fa bene all'Italia e alla sinistra* proposed by Fulvia Bandoli, leader of the association *Ecological Left*. The four motions obtained, respectively, 79 percent, 15 percent, 4 percent and 2 percent of delegates' votes.

The congress held in Florence in 2007 (April 19-21) was actually the last held by the DS. The current secretary Fassino ratified the move toward the foundation of the Democratic Party. The official birth of the new party was scheduled October 14, 2007. Three motions were debated: the first, *Per il Partito Democratico*, proposed by the party leader, strongly advocated the foundation of the new center party. The second, *A Sinistra. Per il socialismo europeo*, was proposed by Fabio Mussi, leader of the internal left faction and a government minister, who also ran as a candidate challenging for party leadership. Mussi and his followers opposed the creation of the DP in any shape or form. The third motion, *Per un partito nuovo, democratico e socialista*, proposed by senator Gavino Angius, was favourable to the creation of the DP only in the event that the new party joins the European PSE. Delegates' support for the three motions was 76 percent for the Fassino motion, 15 percent for the Mussi motion and 9 percent for the Angius motion.

Mussi left the DS following the party Congress. On May 5 May 2007, he founded a new party called *Sinistra Democratica (Democratic Left)*. On 16 May 2007 Mussi and his followers formed new parliamentary groups: the group in the Chamber comprised 22 MPs; the group in the Senate comprised 12 senators.

## 5. MAPPING DS FACTION MEMBERSHIP

Our first task is to estimate the location of individual DS members *vis-à-vis* the two main internal party factions, the “leadership” faction and the “internal left” faction. We use two different empirical measures to map the factional structure of the DS. The first derives from the explicit way in which members identify with party factions by signing faction-sponsored motions at party congresses. The second is a more nuanced measure of policy positions, deriving from content analyses of delegates’ speeches on these same congress motions.

### **Signing congress motions**

As we have seen, the first two party congresses involved extensive debate on significant motions. In each congress, one motion was proposed by each main faction, setting out opposing views on the ideological direction of the party. Large numbers of congress delegates signed these competing motions and we can use the motion a delegate signed as a clear public signal of factional affiliation. We thus collected data on delegate signatures and used these to identify each signatory with the faction proposing the motion signed.

### **Wordscoring congress speeches**

As we have just seen, DS party congresses at Torino and Pesaro debated “rival” motions about the ideological orientation of the party, each motion proposed by one of the party factions and summarizing its overall position. Large numbers of delegates spoke in congress debates on these motions. We collected these speeches and analyzed their content, using the “word-scoring” technique for computational text analysis devised by Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003), to estimate the closeness of each speaker to the faction positions set out in the motions.<sup>3</sup> Essentially this technique estimates for one or more policy dimensions the (unknown) positions of a set of “virgin” texts under investigation, stating these positions in relation to the (known or assumed) positions of a particular set of “reference” texts. We treated congress speeches of individual delegates as virgin texts, measuring positions of each speaker relative to congress motions proposed by each

---

<sup>3</sup> The word scoring software for conducting this analysis, which integrates as a set of subroutines into *Stata* 8, can be downloaded from [http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/kbenoit/wordscores](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/kbenoit/wordscores).

faction, which we treated as reference texts. Since the ideal is to have reference texts with as many words as possible and since the two party congresses took place within 22 months of each other, we generated reference texts for each faction by concatenating texts of their motions at the Torino and Pesaro congresses. The resulting reference text for the leadership faction had 27,934 words and was given an assumed reference score of zero; the reference text for the internal left faction had 15,932 words and was given an assumed policy score of  $-1$ .<sup>4</sup> The two reference texts thus generate a latent policy dimension with the leadership faction located at the origin and the internal left at an arbitrary position of  $-1$ . Word scores were generated for this *a priori* dimension using the Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) technique.

Results of word scoring speeches by DS faction members at both the Torino and Pesaro congresses are summarized in Figure 1. The top panel is a box plot summarizing the scores of those speakers, broken down by factional affiliation, who also attached signatures to congress motions. Computerized word scoring clearly distinguishes between members of the three party factions. The lower panel shows mean text scores for speeches made by members of the two main factions. Recalling that the reference score for leadership motions was zero and for internal left motions was  $-1$ , the mean score was  $-0.24$  for members of the leadership faction, and  $-1.07$  for members of the internal left, a difference of means significant statistically at better than the 0.001 level.

<<*Figure 1 here*>>

## 5. LEGISLATIVE PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE DS

### **Substantive bases of intra-DS policy disagreement**

The most important policy divisions within the DS were a product of internal differences over foreign policy. “Much more than by matters of economic policy, the traditional identity of the Italian communism was shaped by matters of foreign policy, the alignment of Italy in the international system and its affiliation to military alliances”, such as NATO (Bellucci *et al.* 2000: 154). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the official position of the

---

<sup>4</sup> The liberal faction also proposed a motion at Pesaro, but we did not use this since only four members of this faction spoke at the Pesaro congress. These speeches were scored, as were all others, on the internal party policy dimension generated by the internal left and leadership faction reference texts.

PDS/DS increasingly moved towards an explicit adoption of the security policy of Europe and NATO. However, the internal left faction within the party was always closer to the much more explicitly pro-peace and anti-NATO policy positions of Communist Refoundation (PRC). Such internal dissent on foreign policy issues was clearly visible in 1999, when the center-left *Ulivo* coalition government – of which DS was a member – sent Italian troops to support NATO military intervention in Kosovo. There was a major split in the party's legislative voting on the Kosovo crisis.<sup>5</sup> This split was controversial and significant for Italian politics as a whole because, for the first time in Italian history, the Prime Minister was actually the leader of the DS.

Dissent within the DS was also manifested when the Italian government, led by the center-right *Polo* coalition with DS in opposition (2001-2005), declared its support for the military operation *Enduring Freedom* by sending Italian troops to Afghanistan on 7 November 2001, and confirmed this support on 3 October 2002. Divisions within the party were again clear during political debates in Italy over the Iraq war, the third international crisis during the period under consideration. Iraq was potentially less divisive for the DS because the leadership of the party was united with the internal left in opposition to any military intervention in Iraq. However, this foreign policy issue became crucial, both inside the DS and for the party's external critics. Despite its generally hostile approach to the Iraq war, any particular DS policy response to Italy's practical role in the international situation, given Prime Minister Berlusconi's support for the military intervention, generated divisions between DS factions. These divisions undermined the ability of the party to present itself in the wider political system as a credible and united party of government<sup>6</sup>.

In 2006, following electoral reform that explicitly rewarded the formation of pre-electoral coalitions, a center left electoral coalition of many parties named *The Union* and led by Romano Prodi, won the general elections. The government that formed after the election could rely on a safe majority in the lower Chamber but only on a very narrow

---

<sup>5</sup> We excluded this from our analysis because the first two Congresses of the DS for which we have data were held afterwards.

<sup>6</sup> On this point Sartori (2004) argued that "The DS is now a unitary party only in terms of electoral statistics ... one third of the DS ... is not reformist but extremist ... if approximately the 7% of the DS (which means a third of the total party vote) is added to the 12-13% of the radical left, the situation is that Bertinotti [leader of the PRC] controls 20% of the left leaving to poor Fassino only 13%".

majority in the Senate (including life-tenured senators). The coalition was enlarged to cover a wider range of left wing parties or confederations of parties, making difficult to maintain a unique agreed policy position in key areas such as economic and foreign policy. In February 2007, the Prodi government faced its first serious crisis after losing, by a two-vote margin, a vote in the Senate on a non-binding resolution on government foreign policy and Italian military presence in Afghanistan. As a consequence, Prodi submitted his resignation as Prime Minister. After formal political consultations, the President of the Republic asked Prodi to request a new investiture vote for his government in both Chambers. On February 28 the government passed a confidence vote in the Senate.

### **Legislative behavior of DS faction members**

Our next task is to characterize the legislative voting behavior of individual DS deputies on crucial foreign policy motions relating to the internally divisive policy issues discussed above. We constructed a dataset that includes the 38 roll call votes on these issues taken between October 2001 and June 2003; these are listed in Table 1. Two of these roll calls concern final votes on the passing of a law: the vote of 4 June 2002 converted into law a government decree concerning the continuation of Italian support for international military operations; the vote of 3 June 2003 was on a bill related to the agreement on a common European defense policy. The other roll calls concern different motions or resolutions proposed by either government or opposition parties on the political response of Italy to some important aspect of the international situation. Thus:<sup>7</sup>

- the session of 9 October 2001 included six votes, on two separate motions proposed by government and opposition, concerning the application of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty;
- the session of 7 November 2001 included seven votes, on two separate motions proposed by government and opposition, concerning sending Italian troops to Afghanistan (the *Enduring Freedom* operation);

---

<sup>7</sup> Some motions (or resolutions) may involve a vote on separate parts of the same motion.

- the session of 3 October 2002 included ten votes, on six separate resolutions proposed by the government and different opposition parties, concerning the continuation of military operations in Afghanistan;
- the session of 3 April 2003 included six votes, on six separate resolutions proposed by the government and different opposition parties, concerning Italian involvement in military operations in Iraq;
- the session of 15 April 2003 included seven votes, on six separate resolutions, concerning Italian involvement in military operations in Iraq.

*<<Table 1 here>>*

For each motion, the DS leadership faction articulated an “official” party position; we can compare individual legislators’ roll call votes with this. More generally, we can identify the position of the majority of each DS faction on each motion. On some occasions the positions of all three factions are the same; on other occasions these positions differ. For each roll call, we can observe for each legislator whether s/he voted in accordance with a particular faction position. An aggregate estimate of the “roll-call loyalty” of each legislator to the official DS party position can be derived by averaging the number of times, in split roll calls, the legislator voted in the same way as the leadership faction, as a proportion of all possible opportunities to do this.

We first investigate the extent to which faction membership, measured by signatures attached to party congress motions, predicts individual legislator behavior on key foreign policy roll calls. Tables 2 and 3 give examples of key roll calls on which DS legislators did, and did not, split their votes.<sup>8</sup> Table 2 cross-tabulates the factional affiliation of DS legislators against their roll call votes on a motion on Italian military involvement in the US-led “Enduring Freedom” operation in Afghanistan. This motion was proposed by a deputy from the PRC, as we have seen a splinter of the former Communist Party with a policy position close to that of the left faction of the DS. It is clear that DS deputies were split on this motion, with members of the majority and liberal

---

<sup>8</sup> We excluded from this table and all subsequent analysis the roll call classification “away on official business”. This applies to only a very few deputies in any single roll call and has no strategic significance, unlike the distinct classifications “abstain” and “present but did not vote”. There were 135 DS deputies during this period, and the number “away on official business” is thus 135 minus the valid N for any given voting table.

factions voting “no” and the bulk of the internal left faction voting “yes”. We use the chi-square statistic for this faction/voting table to measure the depth of this split. When all party factions vote in an identical manner there will be a very low and insignificant chi-square; when factional affiliation systematically predicts voting behavior there will be a much higher and statistically significant chi-square. For the roll call reported in Table 2 there is, as expected, a high chi-square and statistically significant relationship between faction membership and roll call voting.

Compare the pattern in Table 2 with that in Table 3, which shows a unified response by DS legislators to a motion relating to NATO proposed by a member of the *Margherita* – a parliamentary grouping to the right of DS. All DS factions voted in the same way, with just the odd exception. The faction/voting table has a much lower, and insignificant, chi-square statistic; roll call voting behavior cannot be predicted from faction membership.

<<*Tables 2 and 3 here*>>

Table 4 summarizes the level of faction-based party splitting in each of the set of foreign policy roll calls analyzed. The first column identifies the roll call; all votes on the same day were taken in the course of a debate on the same issue. The remaining two columns show the extent to which the DS vote was split, summarized by chi-squared statistic for the faction-voting tables analogous to those shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 shows a significant number of foreign policy roll-calls in which the split in the DS vote was statistically significant – in which faction membership predicts roll-call voting behavior.

<<*Table 4 here*>>

There can be high levels of faction-structured vote splitting in DS roll calls, even when the majority of deputies from each faction voted in the same way. Table 5 illustrates this with a DS roll call for another motion on NATO, proposed (this time by a member of *Forza Italia*) during the same debate as the motion reported in Table 3. The majority of deputies in each DS faction voted in the same way, abstaining. However a significant minority of deputies from the internal left voted “no”, while no member of the leadership or liberal factions did this. This is the second roll call listed in Table 4; this faction/voting relationship has a highly significant chi-square.

<<*Table 5 here*>>

Overall Table 4 shows us that, for each foreign policy debate except the June 2003 debate on European defense policy, there was at least one legislative roll call that significantly split the DS on factional lines. Factional affiliation, measured by signatures attached to motions at party congresses, is clearly structuring legislative voting by DS deputies.

### **Faction membership and the aggregate foreign policy voting profile of DS deputies**

We now move from the behavior of DS legislators on individual roll calls, to their aggregate voting behavior across the set of foreign policy debates investigated. An index of roll call loyalty was calculated for each deputy. This aggregates his or her behavior across all of the “deeply divided” roll calls reported in Table 4. A deeply divided roll call was taken as one with a very highly significant ( $<0.001$ ) chi-square statistic for the relevant faction-voting table – these roll calls can thus be identified from Table 4. The “roll-call loyalty” score for a given deputy is the number of times s/he voted in the same way as the majority of leadership faction in such roll calls, as a proportion of all opportunities to do so. Thus a deputy who always voted with the leadership faction would score 1, while a deputy who never did would score zero.

The top panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of DS deputies’ roll call loyalty scores, broken down by factional affiliation. This sums up in a very graphic way the deep divisions between DS factions over foreign policy; the internal left shows very much lower levels of roll-call loyalty on foreign policy motions than members of the leadership or liberal factions. The lower panel of Figure 2 shows that the loyalty scores of internal left members were on average half of those of members of the leadership factions. The average member of the internal left faction voted the party line in only 43 percent of these divisive foreign policy roll calls, compared to an 89 percent score for the average member of the leadership faction, a difference of means that is highly significant statistically.

*<<Figure 2 here>>*

### ***Congress speech content and the legislative voting behavior of DS deputies***

Although the roll call information we have relates to all 135 DS deputies, only a small proportion of these deputies made speeches at the party congresses. Thus only 21 DS deputies made speeches at the Torino congress, 19 at the Pesaro congress, and only 12

deputies made speeches at both. For this small subset of 28 DS deputies, however, we can investigate the extent to which their legislative voting behavior on divisive foreign policy issues is explained by their policy position within the party, estimated by scoring their congress speeches. The top panel of Figure 3 shows a scatterplot with the policy scores of congress speeches by DS deputies on the horizontal axis and their roll-call loyalty scores on the vertical axis, with deputies categorized by party faction.<sup>9</sup> Once more, patterns are quite striking. DS deputies associated with the internal left faction have both highly negative policy scores for their congress speeches and low roll-call loyalty scores.

Roll call voting would be a more reliable way to identify faction members than congress speeches, however, because it turns out that those congress speakers from the leadership faction who were also deputies tended to make more left-wing congress speeches than non-deputy members of the same faction. This can be seen by comparing the mean speech scores, by faction, in the lower panel of Figure 3 with the equivalent panels of Figure 2. Thus, while congress speeches by internal left deputies are distinctively left-wing, and are associated with distinctively low levels of roll-call voting loyalty, congress speeches by deputies from the leadership faction tend to range much more widely from right to left.<sup>10</sup> In other words, deputies in the leadership faction may sign motions associated with the leadership faction and vote loyally on foreign policy, but may give relatively left-wing congress speeches. In contrast, deputies from internal left are easy to identify, giving left-wing congress speeches and often not voting the party line on key foreign policy roll calls.

<<Figure 3 here>>

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has set out to advance our understanding of the role of factions in intra-party politics. Reviewing existing theoretical work on party cohesion and discipline, and defining a faction as a collection of members supporting some putative party leader, we identified intra-party factions as sources of structure in intra-party politics. We used an

---

<sup>9</sup> When a deputy spoke at both congresses, the score for his/her Pesaro speech was used since the Pesaro congress more immediately preceded the roll calls under analysis. When a deputy spoke at only one congress, the score of this speech was used.

<sup>10</sup> The cluster of four “left-wing” leadership faction deputies in the top left of the scatterplot comprises Bersani, De Luca, Filippeschi and Lucá.

empirical account of inter-factional politics within the Italian DS to give substance to some developing theoretical ideas. We showed that the DS factions can be mapped by analyzing endorsements of, and the content of speeches on, conference motions debated in DS party congresses. We then showed a clear relationship between the factional structure we mapped in these ways and indicators of party cohesion and/or discipline we derived from the behavior of DS deputies in individual roll calls on divisive legislative motions on foreign policy.

In many ways, of course, the DS is a very “easy” case if we want to understand intra-party inter-factional politics. Not only are the DS factions defined with blinding clarity, with faction members clearly identifiable, but legislator behavior on key roll call votes is clearly structured on factional lines. The characterization of a faction as a set of supporters of a putative leader, furthermore, is illustrated in the starkest possible terms by the breakaway of the Mussi faction to form a new party, *Sinistra Democratica*, in May 2007. We do not claim, therefore, that our analysis of this case in any sense “tests” some theoretical account of intra-party politics. Rather, we see our account of factional politics with the Italian of the DS as a theoretically informed “model generator”, to be added to existing theoretically-informed accounts of factional politics within the Italian DC and the Japanese LDP. Our hope is that these cases will inform a new model of party politics that abandons the unitary actor assumption and sees the decision making “engine” of political parties as being driven by intra-party, inter-factional competition.

**Table 1: Roll call votes on key foreign policy issues in Italy, 2001-2003**

| <i>Date and official number of roll call votes</i> | <i>Issue</i>   | <i>Final vote, motions or resolutions</i>                      | <i>Government party sponsor</i> | <i>Opposition party sponsor</i> |
|--|--|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Oct 09 01 v128                                     |  | Res. Vito n.6-00004 part I                                     | FI                              |                                 |
| Oct 09 01 v129                                     |  | Res. Vito n.6-00004 part II                                    | FI                              |                                 |
| Oct 09 01 v130                                     | Application of article 5 of the NATO Treaty  | Res. n.6-00006 (motivation)                                    |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Oct 09 01 v131                                     |  | Res. Rutelli et al n. 6-00006                                  |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Oct 09 01 v132                                     |  | Res. Rutelli et al n. 6-00006 p.9                              |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Oct 09 01 v133                                     |  | Res. N. 6-00007  |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Nov 07 01 v1                                       |  | Res. N.6-9 Vito cap. I, II, III, V, VI                         | FI                              |                                 |
| Nov 07 01 v2                                       | Italian military involvement in Afghanistan ( <i>Enduring Freedom</i> operation)                 | Res. N.6-9 Vito cap. IV  | FI                              |                                 |
| Nov 07 01 v3                                       |  | Res. N.6-10 Rutelli (motivation)                               |                                 |                                 |
| Nov 07 01 v4                                       |  | Res. N.6-10 Rutelli cap. I, II, III                            |                                 |                                 |
| Nov 07 01 v5                                       |  | Res. N.6-10 Rutelli cap. IV                                    |                                 |                                 |
| Nov 07 01 v6                                       |  | Res. N.6-9 Vito disp and Res. Rutelli u2c                      | Gov. and opposition combined    |                                 |
| Nov 07 01 v7                                       |  | Doc. LVII n.1-bis Res. 6-11                                    |                                 |                                 |
| Jun 04 02 v17                                      | Continuation of Italian involvement in international military operations                         | Conversion into law of decree n.64/2002 (AC 2666) (final vote) |                                 |                                 |
| Oct 03 02 v4                                       | Continuation of Italian military involvement in Afghanistan ( <i>Enduring Freedom</i> operation) | Res. Bertinotti et al. n.6-32 part I                           |                                 | PRC                             |
| Oct 03 02 v5                                       |  | Res. Bertinotti et al. n.6-32 part II                          |                                 | PRC                             |
| Oct 03 02 v6                                       |  | Res. Ramponi et al n 6-33                                      | AN                              |                                 |
| Oct 03 02 v7                                       |  | Res. Rizzo et al. N.6-34 p. I                                  |                                 | PDC                             |
| Oct 03 02 v8                                       |  | Res. Pisicchio et al n.6-35 p.I                                |                                 | Misto (Other)                   |
| Oct 03 02 v9                                       |  | Res. Pisicchio et al n.6-35 p.II                               |                                 | Misto (Other)                   |
| Oct 03 02 v10                                      |  | Res. Fassino et al n. 6-36                                     |                                 | DS                              |
| Oct 03 02 v11                                      |  | Res. Castagnetti n.6-37 p. I                                   |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Oct 03 02 v12                                      |  | Res. Castagnetti n.6-37 p. II                                  |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Oct 03 02 v13                                      |  | Res. Castagnetti n.6-37 p.III                                  |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Apr 03 03 v10                                      | Italian military involvement in Iraq   | Motion M.Cossutta et al 1-00175                                |                                 | PDC                             |
| Apr 03 03 v11                                      |  | Motion Violante et al 1-00177                                  |                                 | DS                              |
| Apr 03 03 v12                                      |  | Motion Burani Procaccini et al 1-00182                         | FI                              |                                 |
| Apr 03 03 v13                                      |  | Motion Intini et al. n. 1-00186                                |                                 | Misto (Other)                   |
| Apr 03 03 v14                                      |  | Res. Craxi 6-58  | Misto (Other)                   |                                 |
| Apr 03 03 v15                                      |  | Res. Vito 6-59   | FI                              |                                 |
| Apr 15 03 v1                                       | Italian military involvement in Iraq   | Res. 6-60 Arrighi et al  | AN                              |                                 |
| Apr 15 03 v2                                       |  | Res. 6-61 Grignaffini et al                                    |                                 | DS                              |
| Apr 15 03 v3                                       |  | Res. 6-62 Belillo et al  |                                 | PRC                             |
| Apr 15 03 v4                                       |  | Res. 6-63 Violante et al Part I                                |                                 | DS                              |
| Apr 15 03 v5                                       |  | Res. 6-63 Violante et al Part I                                |                                 | DS                              |
| Apr 15 03 v6                                       |  | Res. 6-64 Colasio et al  |                                 | Margherita                      |
| Apr 15 03 v7                                       |  | Res. 6-65 Vito et al   | FI                              |                                 |
| Jun 03 03 v77                                      | Agreement on a common European defense policy  | DDL 1927 B Agreement on European Defense (final vote)          |                                 |                                 |

**Table 2: Deeply split DS roll call on Afghanistan**

| <i>Faction</i>            | <i>Liberal component</i> | <i>Internal left</i> | <i>Party leader loyal</i> | <i>Other</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>Vote</i>               |                          |                      |                           |              |              |
| Yes                       |                          | 21                   |                           | 1            | 22           |
| No                        | 11                       | 6                    | 65                        | 7            | 89           |
| Abstain                   |                          | 6                    | 2                         |              | 8            |
| Present, but did not vote |                          | 4                    | 6                         |              | 10           |
| Total                     | 11                       | 37                   | 73                        | 8            | 129          |
| <i>Chi-Square Tests</i>   | <i>Value</i>             | <i>df</i>            | <i>Sig.</i>               |              |              |
| Pearson Chi-Square        | 80.3                     | 9                    | .000                      |              |              |
| Likelihood Ratio          | 88.8                     | 9                    | .000                      |              |              |

Roll call of October 3 2002. Italian military involvement in Afghanistan (continuation of *Enduring Freedom*). Res. Bertinotti (PRC) et al n 6-32 part II (vote n. 5).

**Table 3: Unified DS roll call on NATO**

| <i>Faction</i>            | <i>Liberal component</i> | <i>Internal left</i> | <i>Party leader loyal</i> | <i>Other</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <i>Vote</i>               |                          |                      |                           |              |              |
| Yes                       | 11                       | 33                   | 69                        | 8            | 121          |
| Abstain                   |                          | 1                    |                           |              | 1            |
| Present, but did not vote |                          | 4                    | 4                         | 2            | 10           |
| Total                     | 11                       | 38                   | 73                        | 10           | 132          |
| <i>Chi-Square Tests</i>   | <i>Value</i>             | <i>df</i>            | <i>Sig.</i>               |              |              |
| Pearson Chi-Square        | 6.60                     | 6                    | .360                      |              |              |
| Likelihood Ratio          | 6.81                     | 6                    | .339                      |              |              |

Roll call of October 9 2001: Application of Article n. 5 of the NATO Treaty. Res. Rutelli et al. (Margherita) n 6-00006 p.9 (vote n. 132).

**Table 4: Summary of factional impact on DS split roll calls**


| <i>Roll call</i> | <i>Chi-square</i> | <i>Sig. chi-square</i> |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Oct 09 01 v128   | 1.8               | .621                   |
| Oct 09 01 v129   | <b>49.0</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 09 01 v130   | 5.4               | .500                   |
| Oct 09 01 v131   | 6.5               | .367                   |
| Oct 09 01 v132   | 6.6               | .360                   |
| Oct 09 01 v133   | 24.2              | .019                   |
| Nov 07 01 v1     | <b>52.0</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Nov 07 01 v2     | 5.8               | .444                   |
| Nov 07 01 v3     | <b>23.1</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Nov 07 01 v4     | 8.3               | .041                   |
| Nov 07 01 v5     | <b>29.7</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Nov 07 01 v6     | <b>48.2</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Nov 07 01 v7     | 10.6              | .101                   |
| Jun 03 02 v17    | <b>72.7</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 03 02 v4     | <b>33.8</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 03 02 v5     | <b>80.3</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 03 02 v6     | 14.5              | .024                   |
| Oct 03 02 v7     | 18.1              | .033                   |
| Oct 03 02 v8     | <b>42.8</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 03 02 v9     | 11.7              | .069                   |
| Oct 03 02 v10    | 8.0               | .233                   |
| Oct 03 02 v11    | <b>50.6</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 03 02 v12    | <b>33.9</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Oct 03 02 v13    | 26.7              | .002                   |
| Apr 03 03 v10    | 2.5               | .481                   |
| Apr 03 03 v11    | 5.4               | .145                   |
| Apr 03 03 v12    | 22.4              | .008                   |
| Apr 03 03 v13    | 5.0               | .174                   |
| Apr 03 03 v14    | 4.7               | .580                   |
| Apr 03 03 v15    | 15.1              | .020                   |
| Apr 15 03 v1     | 2.2               | .530                   |
| Apr 15 03 v2     | 2.2               | .530                   |
| Apr 15 03 v3     | 3.4               | .762                   |
| Apr 15 03 v4     | 1.3               | .734                   |
| Apr 15 03 v5     | 2.0               | .572                   |
| Apr 15 03 v6     | 3.1               | .386                   |
| Apr 15 03 v7     | <b>87.2</b>       | <b>.000</b>            |
| Jun 03 03 v77    | 8.0               | .237                   |

*PNV = Present, but did not vote*

**Table 5: Moderately split DS roll call on NATO**

| <i>Faction</i>            | <i>Liberal<br/>component</i> | <i>Internal<br/>left</i> | <i>Party leader,<br/>loyal</i> | <i>Other</i> | <i>Total</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Vote                      |                              |                          |                                |              |              |
| No                        |                              | 15                       |                                |              | 15           |
| Abstain                   | 11                           | 20                       | 67                             | 9            | 107          |
| Present, but did not vote |                              | 3                        | 4                              | 3            | 10           |
| Total                     | 11                           | 38                       | 71                             | 12           | 132          |
| <i>Chi-Square Tests</i>   |                              | <i>Value</i>             | <i>df</i>                      | <i>Sig.</i>  |              |
| Pearson Chi-Square        |                              | 48,99                    | 6                              | ,000         |              |
| Likelihood Ratio          |                              | 48,71                    | 6                              | ,000         |              |


Roll call of October 9 2001. Application of Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty. Res.Vito (Forza Italia) n 6-00004 part II (vote n. 129).



| Faction | N  | Mean   | Std. Deviation | Std. Error |
|---------|----|--------|----------------|------------|
| Leader  | 59 | -0.238 | .722           | .094       |
| Left    | 24 | -1.070 | .514           | .105       |

*Difference of means significant at better than 0.001 level.*


Figure 1: Policy scores of speeches at DS Torino and Pesaro congresses, by faction



| <i>Faction</i> | <i>N</i> | <i>Mean</i> | <i>Std. Deviation</i> | <i>Std. Error</i> |
|----------------|----------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Leader         | 75       | .886        | .138                  | .016              |
| Left           | 38       | .430        | .292                  | .047              |

*Difference of means significant at better than 0.001 level.*

*Figure 2: DS deputies' roll call voting loyalty, by faction*



Mean congress speech scores of DS deputies

| Faction | N  | Mean   | Std. Deviation | Std. Error |
|---------|----|--------|----------------|------------|
| Leader  | 14 | -0.499 | .985           | .263       |
| Left    | 9  | -1.420 | .430           | .144       |

Difference of means significant at 0.016 level.

**Figure 3: Policy scores of speeches at DS congresses, by roll-call voting loyalty on foreign policy, by faction.**

## REFERENCES

- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bellucci, Paolo, Maraffi Marco and Paolo Segatti. 2000. *PCI, PDS, DS. La trasformazione dell'identità politica della sinistra di governo*. Roma. Donzelli.
- Besley, Timothy J., and Stephen Coate. 1997. An economic model of representative democracy. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, 85–114.
- Bouissou, Jean-Marie. 2001. Party factions and the politics of coalition: Japanese politics under the “system of 1955”. *Electoral Studies* 20:581–602
- Buchanan, James. 1965. An economic theory of clubs. *Economica*. 32: 1-14
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cox, Gary, and Mathew McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming
- Cox, G. W. and F. Rosenbluth (1993). "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan." *American Political Science Review*, **87**(3): 577-589.
- Cox, G. W., F. M. Rosenbluth and M. F. Thies (1999). "Electoral reform and the fate of factions: the case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party." *British Journal of Political Science* **29**: 33-56.
- Cox, G. W., F. M. Rosenbluth and M. F. Thies (2000). "Electoral rules, career ambitions, and party structure: comparing factions in Japan's upper and lower houses." *American Journal of Political Science*, **44**(1): 115-122.
- De Marchi, Scott. 1999. Adaptive Models and Electoral Instability. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 11(July): 393-419.
- De Marchi, Scott. 2003. A Computational Model of Voter Sophistication, Ideology and Candidate Position-taking. In Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page. 2003. *Computational models in political economy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Ellickson, B., B. Grodal, S. Scotchmer, W. Zame. 1999. Clubs and the Market. *Econometrica* 67:1185-1218
- Eguia, J. X. (2007). *Voting blocs, coalitions and parties*, Department of Politics, New York University.
- Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver and Peter Mair. 2005. *Representative Government in Modern Europe (4<sup>th</sup> edition)*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Gamson, W. A. (1961). "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review* **26**: 373-382.
- Giannetti, Daniela and Michael Laver. 2005. Policy positions and jobs in the government. *European Journal of Political Research*. 44: 1-30.
- Hix, Simon. 2001. Legislative behaviour and party competition in the European Parliament: an application of Nominat to the EU. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39:4 (November 2001), 663-688
- Huber, John. 1996. *Rationalizing parliament: legislative institutions and party politics in France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Jackson, Matthew O. and Boaz Moselle. 2002. Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp 49-87.
- Kollman, Ken, John Miller and Scott Page. 1992. Adaptive parties in spatial elections. *American Political Science Review*. 86 (December) 929-937.
- Kollman, Ken, John Miller and Scott Page. 1998. Political parties and electoral landscapes. *British Journal of Political Science*. 28 (January): 139-158.
- Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page. 2003. Political institutions and sorting in a Tiebout model. pp 187-212 in Kollman, Ken, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page. 2003. *Computational models in political economy*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1): 235-66.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Laver, Michael. 2005. Policy and the dynamics of political competition. *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming.
- Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit and John Garry. 2003. Estimating the policy positions of political actors using words as data. *American Political Science Review* 97:2 311-331.
- Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government: the Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Leiserson, M. (1968). "Factions and coalitions in one-party Japan: an interpretation based on the theory of games." *American Political Science Review* 62(3): 770-787.
- Levy, Gilat. 2004. A model of political parties. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 115, 250-277.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1992. *Presidential versus parliamentary government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Luebbert, Gregory M. 1986. *Comparative democracy : policy making and governing coalitions in Europe and Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press
- McCarty, Nolan Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal. 2001. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 95, No. 3, 673-687
- McGann, A. J.. 2002. The advantages of ideological cohesion: a model of constituency representation and electoral competition in multi-party democracies. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 14(1): 37-70
- Mershon, C. (2001). "Contending models of portfolio allocation and office payoffs to party factions: Italy, 1963-79." *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2): 277-293.
- Mershon, C. (2001). "Party factions and coalition government: portfolio allocation in Italian Christian Democracy." *Electoral Studies* 20: 555-580.
- Nokken, Timothy P. 2000. "Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll Call Behavior, 1947-1997." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25 (3): 417-44.
- Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski. 1996. A model of political competition with citizen-candidates. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111: 65-96.
- Perroni, Carlo and Kimberly A. Scharf. 2001. Tiebout with politics: capital tax competition and constitutional choices. *Review of Economic Studies*, 68: 133-154.

- Saalfeld, Thomas. 2000. Members of parliament and governments in Western Europe: agency relations and problems of oversight *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 353–376
- Sandler, Todd and John Tschirhart. 1997. Club theory: Thirty years later. *Public Choice*. 93: 335 - 355
- Sartori, Giovanni, “La sinistra frammentata”, *Corriere della Sera*, June 23 2004.
- Snyder, James M., Jr., and Tim Groseclose. 2000. “Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll Call Voting.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 193–211.
- Snyder, James M., Jr., and Tim Groseclose. 2001. “Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success ” *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 95, No. 3, 689-698
- Snyder, James M. and Michael M. Ting. 2002. An informational rationale for political parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46: 90–110
- Tiebout, C. (1956) A pure theory of local expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy*. 64(5): 416-24