

Steven J. Brams

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Marital Status: Married, two children

Education

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, B.S. in Politics, Economics, and Science, 1962
Northwestern University, Ph.D. in Political Science, 1966

Professional Experience

Professor, Dept. of Politics, New York University, 1976- (Acting Chair, 1987-88);
Associate Professor, 1973-76; Assistant Professor, 1969-73
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Syracuse University, 1967-69
Research Associate, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1965-67
Executive Trainee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Summer 1963
Program Analyst, Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health, Summer 1962

Visiting Appointments

Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar, 1998-99
Yale University, Spring 1991, Fall 1981, Spring 1977
University of Haifa, Fall 1984
University of California, Irvine, Winter-Spring 1979
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, June 1978
University of Pennsylvania, Fall 1978, Fall 1977, Spring 1972
University of Rochester, 1972-73, Fall 1971, 1968-69, Spring 1967
University of Michigan, 1969-70

Awards

Grants

NYU Research Challenge Fund, 2002
National Science Foundation, 1968-70 (with M. K. O'Leary), 1970-71, 1973, 1974-75,
1980-83, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1988-91

U.S. Institute of Peace, 1988-89
 Sloan Foundation, 1986-89
 U.S.–Israel Binational Science Foundation (with D. S. Felsenthal and Z. Maoz), 1985-88
 Ford Foundation (with W. J. Baumol and D. Fischer), 1984-85
 Social Science Research Council, Summer 1968

Fellowships

Public Choice Society Fellow, 1998
 American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow, 1992
 Guggenheim Fellowship, 1986-87
 Social Science Research Council Research Training Fellowship, 1964-65

Offices and Honors

Susan Strange Award (lifetime achievement), International Studies Association, 2002
 APSA Delegate, AAAS Section on Social, Economic and Political Sciences (K), 1983-86
 Consortium Council, Modules and Monographs in Undergraduate Mathematics and Its Applications Project (UMAP), 1980-83; UMPA National Steering Committee, 1976-80
 Editorial Boards: *Texts in Logic and Games*, 2008-
 International Studies Quarterly, 1999-2003
 Rationality and Society, 1999-
 Scientiae Mathematicae, 1998-
 Mathematica Japonica, 1998-
 Control and Cybernetics, 1993-
 Group Decision and Negotiation, 1991-
 Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1988-
 Theory and Decision, 1982-
 Mathematical Social Sciences, 1980-
 Journal of Politics, 1968-73, 1978-82, 1991-
 Journal of Behavioral Decisionmaking, 1987-90
 Public Choice, 1973-90, 2003-
 American Political Science Review, 1978-82

Conference and Workshop Directorships

Director, Summer Faculty Workshops on Mathematical Modeling in Political Science, 1986-89 (sponsored by Sloan Foundation)
 Co-director, International Conference on Applied Game Theory, Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS), Vienna, June 12-15, 1978 (sponsored by IAS)
 Director, Workshop on Mathematical Models of Political Campaigns, University of Rochester, June 4-15, 1973 (sponsored by National Science Foundation)

Professional Societies and Offices Held

American Association for the Advancement of Science
 American Economics Association
 American Political Science Association
 Center for Economic Design
 Game Theory Society—Council, 2004-2007
 International Studies Association

Mathematical Association of America
 Peace Science Society (International)—President, 1990-91
 Policy Studies Organization
 Public Choice Society—President, 2004-2006
 Research Centre for Political Processes (Russian Academy of Sciences)
 Society for Judgment and Decision Making
 Society for Social Choice and Welfare—Council, 2004-2005

U.S. Patent

With Alan D. Taylor, *Computer-Based Method for the Fair Division of Ownership of Goods*, #5983205, granted 11/9/99 and assigned to New York University.

Books

1. *Game Theory and Politics*. New York: Free Press, 1975. Rev. ed., 2004 (Dover).
2. *Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science*. New York: Free Press, 1976.
3. *The Presidential Election Game*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978. Rev. ed., 2008 (A K Peters).
4. Co-edited with A. Schotter and G. Schwödiauer, *Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference*, Vienna, 1978. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 1979.
5. *Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980. Rev. ed., 2003 (MIT Press). Japanese translation, 2006.
6. Co-edited with William F. Lucas and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., *Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models*, vol. 2. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983.
7. Co-authored with Peter C. Fishburn, *Approval Voting*. Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
8. *Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game-Theoretic Implications of Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality, and Incomprehensibility*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983. Rev. ed., 2007 (Springer).
9. *Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
10. *Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985. Reprinted by Academic Press, 1989.
11. Co-authored with D. Marc Kilgour, *Game Theory and National Security*. New York:

Basil Blackwell, 1988. Spanish translation, 1989.

12. *Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration*. New York: Routledge, 1990. Rev. ed., 2003.
13. *Theory of Moves*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
14. Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, *Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
15. Co-authored with Alan D. Taylor, *The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999. Japanese, Portuguese, and Spanish translations, 2000; Chinese, Korean, and Russian translations, 2002.
16. *Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
17. Co-edited with William V. Gehrlein and Fred S. Roberts. *The Mathematics of Preference, Choice, and Order: Essays in Honor of Peter C. Fishburn*. New York: Springer, 2008 (forthcoming).

Articles and Professional Papers

1966

1. "A Generalized Computer Program for the Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Behavioral Science* 10 (October): 487-488.
2. "Trade in the North Atlantic Area: An Approach to the Analysis of Transformations in a System," *Peace Research Society (International): Papers* 6 (Vienna Conference, 1966): 143-164.
3. "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review* 60 (December): 880-898.

1967

4. With Chadwick F. Alger, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," *World Politics* 19 (July): 646-663.

1968

5. "A Note on the Cosmopolitanism of World Regions," *Journal of Peace Science* 5: 87-95.
6. "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems," *American Political Science Review* 67 (June): 461-475. Reprinted in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, R. Harrison Wagner (eds.), *Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research*. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 346-359.
7. "DECOMP: A Computer Program for the Condensation of a Directed Graph and the Hierarchical Ordering of Its Strong Components," *Behavioral Science* 13 (July): 344-345.

1969

8. "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, 2d ed. New York: Free Press, pp. 583-599.
9. "The Search for Structural Order in the International System: Some Models and Preliminary Results," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (September): 254-280.

1970

10. With Michael K. O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June): 449-470.
11. "The APSA and Minority Representation," *PS* 3 (Summer): 321-335.

1971

12. With Michael K. O'Leary, "PROVOTE: A Computer Program for the Probabilistic Analysis of Voting Bodies," *Behavioral Science* 16 (May-June): 261-263.
13. With Michael K. O'Leary, "Comment on Mayer's 'A Note on an Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies'" (#10 above), *American Political Science Review* 65 (September): 766.

1972

14. With William H. Riker, "Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies," in James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (eds.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VI*. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, pp. 79-124.
15. "A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies," in Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (eds.), *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, pp. 101-124.

1973

16. "Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior," in Cornelius P. Cotter (ed.), *Political Science Annual IV: An International Review*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, pp. 3-40.
17. With Morton D. Davis, "Models of Resource Allocation in Presidential Campaigning: Implications for Democratic Representation," in L. Papayanopoulos (ed.), *Democratic Representation and Apportionment: Quantitative Methods, Measures, and Criteria, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 219: 105-123.
18. "The Paradox of Vote Trading," *American Political Science Review* 67 (December): 1235-1274. Abbreviated version reprinted in Lawrence M. Friedman and Stewart Macaulay, *Law and the Behavioral Sciences*, 2d ed. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977, pp. 49-50.

1974

19. With John Heilman, "When to Join a Coalition, and with How Many Others, Depends on What You Expect the Outcome to Be," *Public Choice* 16 (Spring): 11-25.
20. With Morton D. Davis, "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning," *American Political Science Review* 68 (March): 113-134. Reprinted in *The Electoral College*

and *Direct Election*, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session, 1977, pp. 515-537.

21. With William H. Riker, "Communications" (on #18 above), *American Political Science Review* 68 (December): 1688-89, 1692.

1975

22. With José E. Garriga-Picó, "Bandwagons in Coalition Formation: The 2/3's Rule," *American Behavioral Scientist* 18 (March/April): 472-496. Reprinted in Barbara Hinckley (ed.), *Coalitions and Time: Cross-Disciplinary Studies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976, pp. 34-58.
23. "Paradoxes in Politics: A Perspective on the Methods of Political Inquiry," *DEA [Division of Education Affairs] News* 5 (Spring): 8-9.
24. "Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19 (December): 596-611.
25. With Morton D. Davis, "Comment on 'Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College'" (on #20 above), *American Political Science Review* 69 (March): 155-156.

1976

26. With Paul J. Affuso, "Power and Size: A New Paradox," *Theory and Decision* 7 (March): 29-56.
27. With Morton D. Davis, "A Game-Theory Approach to Jury Selection," *Trial* 12 (December): 47-49.

1977

28. "When Is It Advantageous to Cast a Negative Vote?" in R. Henn and O. Moeschlin (eds.), *Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems* 141: 564-572.
29. "Comments," in John V. Gillespie and Dina A. Zinnes (eds.), *Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research*. New York: Praeger, pp. 167, 421.
30. With Douglas Muzzio, "Game Theory and the White House Tapes Case," *Trial* 13 (May): 48-53.
31. "Deception in 2 x 2 Games," *Journal of Peace Science* 2 (Spring): 171-203.
32. "The Network Television Game: There May Be No Best Schedule," *Interfaces* 7 (August): 102-109. Reprinted in *UMAP Journal* 1 (1980): 104-114.
33. With Frank C. Zagare, "Deception in Simple Voting Games," *Social Science Research* 6 (September): 257-272.
34. With Douglas Muzzio, "Unanimity in the Supreme Court: A Game-Theoretic Explanation of the Decision in the White House Tapes Case," *Public Choice* 32 (Winter) 67-83.

1978

35. With Mark Lake, "Power and Satisfaction in a Representative Democracy," in Peter C. Ordeshook (ed.), *Game Theory and Political Science*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 529-562.
36. "Applying Game Theory to Antitrust Litigation," *Jurimetrics Journal* 18 (Summer): 320-327.
37. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting," *American Political Science Review* 72

(September): 831-847.

38. With Morton D. Davis, "Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," *Operations Research* 26, no. 6 (November-December): 966-991.
39. "Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign," *American Political Science Review* 72 (December): 1362-1364.
40. "The N-Prisoners' Dilemma: Another Solution," *American Political Science Review* 72 (December): 1365-1366.

1979

41. With Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "Prisoners' Dilemma and Professional Sports Drafts," *American Mathematical Monthly* 86 (February): 80-88.
42. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin Jr., "The Geometry of the Arms Race," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (December): 567-588.
43. "Alternatives for Increasing Voter Participation," in Stuart Langton (ed.), *Citizen Participation Perspectives: Proceedings of the National Conference on Citizen Participation*. Medford, MA: Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, pp. 235-238.
44. "Approval Voting: A Practical Reform for Multicandidate Elections," *National Civic Review* 68 (November): 549-553.
45. "Faith Versus Rationality in the Bible: Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Sacrifice in the Old Testament," in S. J. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwödianer (eds.), *Applied Game Theory: Proceedings of a Conference, Vienna, 1978*. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 430-445.
46. "But They Say He Won the Primary," *New York Times*, November 27, p. A23 (Op-Ed page).
47. "Reply to 'Comment on Brams and Fishburn'" (on #37 above) *American Political Science Review* 73 (June): 552.

1980

48. "Approval Voting in N.H." *Concord (N.H.) Monitor*, January 9, p. 16 (Guest Editorial).
49. "Baker Could Have Survived N.H.," *Concord (N.H.) Monitor*, March 8, p. 9.
50. "Approval Voting in Multicandidate Elections," *Policy Studies Journal* 9 (Autumn): 102-108.
51. With Morton D. Davis, "Rejoinder" (on #38 above), *Operations Research* 28 (July-August 1980): 1024-1025.
52. Letter (on #44 above), *National Civic Review* 69 (May 1980): 247.

1981

53. "Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God's Omniscience," *Mathematics Magazine* 53 (November): 277-282.
54. "One Candidate, One Vote: A New Approach to the Electoral Process," *Archway: The Magazine of Arts & Science at New York University* 2 (Winter): 10-14. Reprinted in *Citizen Participation* 4 (November-December 1982): 11, 14.
55. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting, Condorcet's Principle, and Runoff Elections," *Public Choice* 36: 89-114.
56. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Efficacy, Power and Equity under Approval Voting,"

Public Choice 37: 425-434.

57. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Reconstructing Voting Processes: The 1976 House Majority Leader Election under Present and Alternative Rules," *Political Methodology* 7: 95-108.
58. With Donald Wittman, "Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2 x 2 Games," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 6 (Fall): 39-62.
59. With Frank C. Zagare, "Double Deception: Two against One in Three-Person Games," *Theory and Decision* 13 (March): 81-90.

1982

60. "Approval Voting: One Candidate, One Vote," in Bernard Grofman *et al.* (eds.), *Representation and Redistricting Issues of the 1980s*. Lexington, MA: Lexington, pp. 137-142.
61. With Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "The Entry Problem in a Political Race," in Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds.), *Political Equilibrium*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, pp. 181-195.
62. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body," in Manfred J. Holler (ed.), *Power, Voting, and Voting Power*. Würzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 239-255.
63. "The AMS Nomination Procedure Is Vulnerable to 'Truncation of Preferences,'" *Notices of the American Mathematical Society* 29 (February): 136-138.
64. "A Resolution of the Paradox of Omniscience," in Michael Bradie and Kenneth Sayre (eds.), *Reason and Decision*, Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy, III. Bowling Green, OH: Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, pp. 17-30.
65. "Is This Any Way to Elect a President?" in Robert S. Hirschfield (ed.), *Selection/Election: A Forum on the American Presidency*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine, pp. 173-177.
66. With Barbara J. Heil, "Approval Voting: How to Improve DC's Crazy Elections," *DC Gazette* 13 (May): 2-4.
67. "Omniscience and Omnipotence: How They May Help—or Hurt—in a Game," *Inquiry* 25 (June): 217-231.
68. "Strategic Information and Voting Behavior," *Society* 19 (September/October): 4-11.
69. With Marek P. Hessel, "Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games," *Behavioral Science* 27 (October): 393-401.
70. With Morton D. Davis, "Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries," *Mathematical Social Sciences* 3 (December): 373-388.
71. "Belief in God: A Game-Theoretic Paradox," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 13: 121-129.
72. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Deducing Preferences and Choices in the 1980 Election," *Electoral Studies* 1: 39-62.

1983

73. With Marek P. Hessel, "Staying Power in Sequential Games," *Theory and Decision* 15 (September): 277-302.
74. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Paradoxes of Preferential Voting," *Mathematics Magazine* 56 (September): 207-214.

75. "God and Games: A Mathematical Look at Superior Beings," *University: Academic Affairs at New York University* 2 (May): 4-5, 8.
76. With Samuel Merrill, III, "Equilibrium Strategies in Final-Offer Arbitration: There Is No Median Convergence," *Management Science* 28 (August): 927-941.
77. "Approval Voting: A Better Way to Elect a President?" *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: Science and Public Policy III* 403: 111-120.
78. "Superior Being, Their Powers, and the Problem of Evil: Can This Be Mathematics?" *UMAP Journal* 4 (September): 265-283.
79. With Peter C. Fishburn, "America's Unfair Elections," *The Sciences* 23 (November/December): 28-34. Reprinted in *Eastern Airlines's Review* (February 1984): 27-34.
80. "Comparison Voting," in Steven J. Brams, William F. Lucas, and Philip D. Straffin, Jr. (eds.), *Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models*, vol. 2 New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 32-65.

1984

81. With Peter C. Fishburn, "A Careful Look at 'Another Look at Approval Voting,'" *Polity* 17 (September): 135-143.
82. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Some Logical Defects of the Single Transferable Vote," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger, pp. 147-151.
83. With Peter C. Fishburn, "A Note on Variable-Size Legislatures to Achieve Proportional Representation," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives*. New York: Praeger, pp. 175-177.
84. "Run Jesse Jackson, But Under Approval Voting," *PS* 16 (Fall): 711-712.
85. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Manipulability of Voting by Sincere Truncation of Preferences," *Public Choice* 44: 397-410.
86. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures," *Social Choice and Welfare* 1: 397-410.
87. With Marek P. Hessel, "Threat Power in Sequential Games," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (March): 23-44.
88. With Peter C. Fishburn, "The Electoral Innovation Debate: Prospects for Approval Voting," *Creativity and Innovation Network* 10 (January-March): 21-27.
89. "Making Presidential Elections Less Front-Loaded," *Presidency Research Group Newsletter* 6 (Spring): 9-11.
90. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Reply" (on #79 above), *The Sciences* (July/August): 4-5.
91. With Morton D. Davis and Philip D. Straffin, Jr., "A Reply to 'Detection and Disarmament'" (on #42 above), *American Political Science Review* 78 (June): 495-496.

1985

92. With Samuel Merrill, III, "Response to Rabow" (on #76 above), *Management Science* 31 (March): 375-376.
93. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Comment on 'The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting'" and "Rejoinder to Niemi," *American Political Science Review* 79 (September): 816-819.
94. With Paul J. Affuso, "New Paradoxes of Voting Power on the EC Council of

- Ministers,” *Electoral Studies* 4 (August): 135-139; “Addendum,” *Electoral Studies* 4 (December): 290.
95. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Optimal Deterrence,” *Social Philosophy & Policy* 3 (Autumn): 118-135. Reprinted in Ellen Frankel Paul *et al.* (eds.), *Nuclear Rights/Nuclear Wrongs*. London: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 118-135; and Newton Garver and Peter H. Hare (eds.), *Naturalism and Rationality*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986, pp. 241-262.
96. With D. Marc Kilgour, “The Path to Stable Deterrence,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward (eds.), *Dynamic Models of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 11-25. Reprinted in Jacek Kugler and Frank C. Zagare (eds.), *Exploring the Stability of Deterrence*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987, pp. 107-122.

1986

97. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Rational Deescalation,” in Doyne Farmer *et al.* (eds.), *Evolution, Games, and Learning: Models of Adaptation in Machines and Nature*, *Physica D* 22: 337-350.
98. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Rudolf Avenhaus, Reiner K. Huber, and John D. Kettelle (eds.), *Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 337-350.
99. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational?” *PS* 19 (Summer): 645-651.
100. With Samuel Merrill, III, “Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination Is Best,” *Management Science* 32 (October): 1346-1355.
101. With Dan S. Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz, “New Chairman Paradoxes,” in Andreas Diekmann and Peter Mitter (eds.), *Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport*. Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, pp. 243-256.
102. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting,” *TWA Ambassador* (November): 17-18.
103. “New, Improved Final-Offer Arbitration,” *New York Times*, August 9, p. 22.

1987

104. With Morton D. Davis, “The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Richard L. Merritt, and Dina A. Zinnes (eds.), *Interaction and Communication in Global Politics*. London: Sage, pp. 141-161.
105. With Peter C. Fishburn, “Approval Voting,” in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.) *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Institutions*. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, p. 27.
106. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Verification and Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” in Allan M. Din (ed.), *Arms and Artificial Intelligence: Weapon and Arms Control Applications of Advanced Computing*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 193-213.
107. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Optimal Threats,” *Operations Research* 35 (July-August): 524-536.
108. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 81 (September): 833-850.
109. With D. Marc Kilgour, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help?” *Analyse und Kritik* 9 (October): 62-74. Reprinted in *Journal of International*

Affairs 4 (Spring): 15-21; and Douglas P. Lackey (ed.), *Ethics and Strategic Defense*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 138-147.

110. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (December): 547-572.

1988

111. With D. Marc Kilgour, "Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (March): 3-28.
112. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?" *PS: Political Science & Politics* 21 (Spring): 277-284.
113. "MAA Elections Produce Decisive Winners," *Focus: The Newsletter of the Mathematical Association of America* 8 (May-June): 1-2.
114. With Peter C. Fishburn and Samuel Merrill, III, "The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen" and "Rejoinder," *Public Choice* 59 (November): 121-131, 149.
115. With D. Marc Kilgour, "National Security Games," *Synthese* 76 (July): 185-200.
116. "Vote Early and Often," *New York Newsday*, March 28, p. 50.
117. With D. Marc Kilgour, "From Deterrence to Defense: The Strategic Implications of SDI," *Mathematical and Computer Modelling* 11: 683-688.
118. With Dan S. Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz, "Chairman Paradoxes under Approval Voting," in Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel (eds.), *Theory and Decision: Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, pp. 223-233.

1989

119. With Rudolf Avenhaus, John Fichtner, and D. Marc Kilgour, "The Probability of Nuclear War," *Journal of Peace Research* 26 (February): 91-99.
120. "Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Co-Equal?" in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman (eds.), *The Federalist Papers: The New Institutionalism and the Old*. New York: Agathon, pp. 125-141.
121. With Paul J. Affuso and D. Marc Kilgour, "Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," in Paul Brace, Christine Harrington, and Gary King (eds.), *The Presidency in American Politics*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 55-74.
122. "Arbitrary Mishmash" (in Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, August 8, p. 15.
123. "They Will Want to Lose" (in Hebrew), *Ha'aretz*, November 18, p. 15.

1990

124. "Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board," *Interfaces* 20 (September-October): 65-79.
125. "Practical Bargaining Procedures and Their Game-Theoretic Foundations," *Information and Decision Technologies* 16: 263-275.
126. "Power and Instability in Multilateral Arms-Control Negotiations," in Reiner K. Huber, Hillmar Linnenkamp, and Ingrad Schölich (eds.), *Military Stability: Prerequisites and Analysis Requirements for Conventional Stability in Europe*. Baden-Baden, Germany: NOMOS-Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 87-96.

1991

127. With Peter C. Fishburn, "Alternative Voting Systems," in L. Sandy Maisel (ed.), *Political Parties and Elections in the United States: An Encyclopedia*, vol. 1. New York: Garland, pp. 23-31. Also in Piotr Ploszajski (ed.), *Philosophy of Social Choice*. Warsaw, Poland: IFis, 1990, pp. 227-247.
128. With D. Marc Kilgour and Shlomo Weber, "Sequential Arbitration Procedures: Dynamic Versus Static Models of ADR," in Stuart S. Nagel and Miriam K. Mills (eds.), *Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution*. New York: Quorum, pp. 199-220.
129. With Morton D. Davis and D. Marc Kilgour, "Optimal Cheating and Inspection Strategies under INF," in Rudolf Avenhaus, Hassane Karkar, and Michel Rudnianski (eds.), *Defense Decision Making: Analytical Support and Crisis Management*. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag, pp. 318-335.
130. Comment on Fritz W. Scharpf, "Games Real Actors Could Play," *Rationality and Society* 3 (April): 252-257.
131. With Samuel Merrill, III, "Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus," *European Journal of Political Economy* 7: 79-92.
132. With Jack H. Nagel, "Approval Voting in Practice," *Public Choice* 71 (August): 1-17.
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